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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CHU HUY MAN SPEECH ON 5th CONGRESS RESOLUTIONS

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 82 pp 1-18

[Speech by Senior General Chu Huy Man, member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee and head of the Political General Department, at the political activity class of high-ranking management cadres within the army:
"Thoroughly Understanding and Organizing the Successful Implementation of the Resolutions of the 5th Party Congress in Order To Excellently Complete the Tasks of the People's Army"]

[Text] Dear Comrades,

The 5th Congress of the Party was a fine success.

In keeping with the directive of the Party Secretariat, the Standing Committee of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and the Ministry of National Defense have decided to conduct a phase of political activities to gain a thorough understanding of the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the Party throughout the army.

This, the first formal class, is very important. As high-ranking management cadres of the army, we have a very large responsibility in achieving the thorough understanding and organizing the successful implementation of the resolutions of the party congress.

In keeping with the division of labor of the Standing Committee of the Military Commission of the Central Party Committee, I will present a number of points in order to help you gain a deeper understanding of and effectively comply with the resolutions of the congress.

I. Clearly Recognizing the Victory and Success of the 5th Congress of the Party and Insuring that the Entire Army Achieves an Increasingly High Level of Unanimity and Develops Increasingly Firm Confidence

The 5th Congress of our party was prepared for and conducted against a rather complex historic background. In the world, the struggle to resolve the question

of "who defeats whom" which exists between socialism and capitalism has become a sharp struggle. Following continuous defeats, imperialism, led by the United States, and the international reactionary powers are frantically assembling forces and launching insane counter-attacks against the revolutionary forces of our times in order to protect their remaining positions and in a vain attempt to win back positions that they have already lost. In this struggle, Vietnam, because of its geo-political position and its role and influence, is one of the targets of attack by counter-revolutionary forces. At home, after 5 years of arduous and decisive struggle to implement the line and carry out the revolutionary tasks set forth by the 4th Congress of the Party, our people, under the leadership of the party, by means of their own sweat and blood and together with the tremendous assistance provided by the Soviet Union, Laos, Kampuchea and the other socialist countries and the strong support of the forces of revolution and peace in the world, recorded tremendous victories and achievements. However, besides these tremendous victories and achievements, there were also jobs that did not yield the desired results and shortcomings and mistakes in one area or another; and, in the immediate future, the socio-economic situation still poses serious difficulties in some areas. The situation was further complicated by the enemy intensifying their hostile policy toward our country and taking advantage of opportunities to oppose us in many areas, which has included their scheme to oppose, undermine and limit the victory and success of our party congress.

Following more than 1 year of very detailed, very active preparations by our party and the holding of democratic and serious congresses from the basic level upward, the party congress was a fine success. As General Secretary Le Duan said in his opening address: "The 5th Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party is the pinnacle of a process of serious work that lasted throughout the period of more than 1 year of preparations and a process of tapping the collective intelligence of the entire party in order to adopt guidelines for resolving the large and pressing problems being faced in the course of development of our country's revolution." The results of the congress were vivid manifestations of the solidarity of our entire party, of the spirit of responsibility of the leading party and of the closeness of the party to the people, the people to the party. The success of the congress was a manifestation of the strength of our party, of our people.

The 5th Congress of the Party was a milestone in the long, arduous struggle by our party and people, a struggle filled with feats of arms, for national independence and socialism. In order to realize the success of the congress, we must have a deep understanding of the following matters:

1. There was a high degree of unanimity at the congress concerning all of the important issues facing the country.

Evaluating the situation in the recent past, the delegates attending the congress unanimously observed: "The past 5 years have been recorded in the nation's history as a stage of very glorious victories for the Vietnamese revolution."(1)

On the basis of reality, the delegates attending the congress unanimously confirmed the correctness of the line on the socialist revolution and the line on building the socialist economy that were set forth by the 4th Congress of the Party and affirmed the correctness of continuing to implement these lines throughout the period of transition, including in the immediate stage.

The congress highly evaluated the correct activities of the 4th Party Central Committee, headed by General Secretary Le Duan, in leading our entire party, all our people and the entire army in implementing the domestic and foreign affairs lines in accordance with the resolutions of the 4th Party Congress. "Amidst the extremely serious situation of the country and in the face of the schemes and acts of aggression of the new enemy, the party adopted determined and wise strategic policies, made precise and timely decisions, brought our country's revolution through an important turning point and continued to develop it in the correct direction."(2)

With a high spirit of responsibility and practicing strict self-criticism and criticism, the delegates attending the congress unanimously and correctly evaluated the country's situation and the state of the economy, analyzed difficulties, shortcomings, mistakes and their causes and proposed measures for overcoming them in order to advance the cause of revolution. Their harsh, brave and open criticism and self-criticism were beautiful manifestations of the revolutionary nature and strength of a genuine, experienced Marxist-Leninist party and of a heroic people.

In order to concretize the line of the 4th Congress, this time, the congress clearly defined the two strategic tasks of our entire party, all our people and our entire army in the new stage of the revolution and decided the guidelines, tasks and primary objectives as well as the basic policies and major socio-economic measures for the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and for the 1980's. The congress also thoroughly discussed the matters of building the party and improving the quality of leadership and the fighting strength of the party, which are matters of decisive significance in the effort to fulfill the strategic tasks of the new stage.

The delegates attending the congress were in agreement concerning their evaluation of the world situation and the foreign policy of our party and state. Our correct stand has won the widespread support and sympathy of the world and, at the 5th Party Congress; "...The voices filled with warm feelings of our brothers and international friends resounded throughout our country, bringing to the communists and the people of Vietnam the loyal friendship, the militant solidarity and the genuine support of the great Soviet Union, of our two fraternal neighbors, Laos and Kampuchea, of the other fraternal countries in the socialist community, of the international communist and worker movement, of the revolutionary people of the world..."(closing speech by Le Duan).

The achievement of a high degree of unanimity concerning all important issues facing the country and the strengthening of our close unity on the basis of the

revolutionary line and tasks of the party were the extremely important achievements of our congress and also represented a clear step forward in the process of struggle to advance the revolution in a manner consistent with the objective laws of the history of society.

2. The congress manifested the firm unanimity of our party as regards organization.

On the basis of unanimity regarding the revolutionary line and tasks and the task of party building in the new stage and on the basis of the results of the process of truly understanding and listening to the opinions of cadres and party members and democratically exchanging opinions and engaging in debate, the congress elected the new Party Central Committee, which consists of comrades who are worthy to be representatives of the intelligence and will of the party, thereby insuring the political stability and the ability to perform practical work of the Party Central Committee. The Party Central Committee also elected the Political Bureau, which consists of leaders who have enjoyed prestige for many years and newly elected comrades who are representative comrades of the party. The structure of the Party Central Committee was correctly improved. This structural improvement is necessary and consistent not only with present circumstances, but also with subsequent development. The congress highly evaluated the tremendous contributions made by the comrades who have been active for many years in the revolution for the cause of liberating the fatherland and for the cause of socialism, comrades who possess a beautiful communist spirit and who voluntarily step down from important positions with the Political Bureau and the Party Central Committee in order to make way for their successors. The congress reminded the cadres on the various levels to follow the examples set by these comrades and struggle throughout their lives for the cause of the revolution in every job assigned to them by the party.

Dear Comrades,

The 5th Congress of the Party was carried out under the slogan: "Everything for the socialist fatherland, for the happiness of the people!" The resolutions of the congress have satisfied the requirements of the country and the basic interests of the people and the nation. The success of the congress is a firm base for uniting the entire party and mobilizing the people of the entire country to firmly adhere to the guidelines for the advance of the revolution, launch an intense activities movement and win new and even larger victories while following the inevitably victorious path of Marxism-Leninism. On the basis of the guidelines and main tasks and objectives and on the basis of the major economic and social policies and measures for the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and for the 1980's, the congress assigned to the new Party Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the agencies of the party and state on the various levels and in the various sectors the task of continuing to urgently formulate the 1981-1985 five year socio-economic plan, improving the management mechanism and establishing specific policies and measures in order to bring about a strong

revolutionary change, bringing the economy through the difficulties it faces and moving it steadily forward.

As regards military affairs and national defense, on the basis of the requirements of the task of being ready to fight to defend the fatherland, determinedly winning victory over the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy and, at the same time, insuring that the country is always ready and possesses adequate strength to triumph over the enemy in any situation, the congress established the task of building a comprehensive, modern national defense system of all the people on the basis of constantly consolidating and strengthening the system of collective ownership of the laboring people in every respect and on the basis of the guideline of building the people's armed forces in accordance with the viewpoint of the people's war and a national defense system of all the people. The congress continued to affirm that "our party is always especially concerned with strengthening its leadership within the Vietnam People's Army"(3) and emphasized "the need to further strengthen the party's leadership of the armed forces"(4) in order to meet the requirements of building the army and strengthening the national defense system and the requirements of a people's war to defend the fatherland in view of the revolutionary situation and tasks of the new stage. In order to strengthen the party's direct, centralized and unified leadership of the armed forces, it is necessary to strengthen the leadership organizations of the party within the army. The congress gave the new Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau the task of researching and deciding this matter in detail.

We know that the important tasks of the congress were to debate and ratify the reports of the Party Central Committee in order to set forth tasks of a strategic nature in the struggle to build socialism and defend the fatherland; set forth the socio-economic guidelines, tasks and main objectives for the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and for the 1980's; determine the guidelines for party building and the various matters regarding amending the Party Statutes; and electing the new Party Central Committee to insure that the entire party successfully carries out the important tasks that were decided upon.

As regards the results of the congress, Le Duan said in his closing speech: "The 5th National Congress of Delegates of the Party has victoriously completed its important task." It was a tremendous victory of profound political and historic significance.

II. Thoroughly Understanding the Resolutions of the Party, Turning Them into Specific Programs of Action of the Entire Army and Struggling To Excellently Complete Every Task of the Army

A. Firmly grasping the objectives and requirements of organizing the effort to gain a thorough understanding of the resolutions of the congress.

Gaining a thorough understanding of the resolutions of the congress is routine, continuous work that is performed throughout the process from one congress to

another by means of many different forms and measures; however, it is necessary to win an initial basic victory and bring about a new change.

The Military Commission of the Party Central Committee issued directive number 107/CT-QU on 12 April 1982 concerning organizing the effort to gain a thorough understanding of the resolutions of the 5th Party Congress within the army. The guiding thinking in this directive is:

--Clearly recognizing the victory and the success of the 5th Congress of the Party;

--Making every effort to thoroughly understand the revolutionary lines and tasks decided by the congress;

--On the basis of recognizing the victory and the success of the congress and thoroughly understanding the revolutionary line and tasks decided by the congress, having firmer confidence, displaying high responsibility and organizing implementation better. To begin with, it is necessary to successfully carry out the military and national defense tasks for 1982 and the years ahead that were set forth by the Political Bureau and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee by making a greater effort, organizing implementation better and achieving greater effectiveness.

In order to meet these objectives and requirements, it is necessary to fully realize that the way to learn these resolutions is to thoroughly understand them and organize their successful implementation. Through their implementation, we must supplement them with specific, correct and creative policies, plans and measures and continue to move forward to satisfactorily complete the tasks of the army, of the unit.

We achieved good results in the stage of democratic debate, of contributing opinions to the Party Central Committee, to the national congress. Now is the time for gaining a thorough understanding and achieving thorough implementation in order to turn the line of the party into real results. This also involves implementing our party's principle of democratic centralism. It is necessary to tap the militancy of the working class and the vanguard nature of the party, display the fine nature and tradition of our army and overcome negative phenomena in order to successfully implement the resolutions of the party congress. It is necessary to be extremely alert and vigilant and promptly crush the clever and dangerous psychological warfare tricks and arguments being employed by the enemy since the congress in a vain attempt to generate skepticism, negativism, a lack of confidence in the prospects for successfully implementing the resolutions of the congress and a lack of confidence in the new Party Central Committee while sowing the attitude of "wait and see" among cadres, party members and the people in order to limit the influence and impact of the victory of the congress and undermine the process of turning the resolutions of the congress into real results.

In keeping with the spirit of the directive of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, we must continue to intensify the determined to win emulation movement, making it an intense, widespread emulation movement throughout the army, in order to successfully implement the resolutions of the 5th Congress. To begin with, we must direct our efforts toward successfully carrying out the 1982 tasks and plans assigned by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and the Ministry of National Defense to the various units, develop upon strengths, create many new factors and new model units and effectively overcome negative phenomena. The emulation movement must be closely guided and scientifically organized, must involve the signing of pledges, must be observed and inspected in a detailed and effective manner, must avoid ostentatiousness and formalism and must involve reports of achievements that are faithful and precise.

Thus, you must relate the basic matters contained within the resolutions of the congress to the realities of the army, to existing military work programs and plans and, on this basis, propose specific amendments, perfect plans and successfully implement them with high results.

B. Fully understanding the basic matters contained within the resolutions of the 5th Party Congress and making every effort to successfully implement these resolutions.

Fully understanding these resolutions first requires firmly grasping the matters of major important, the basic viewpoints of the party within these resolutions, firmly grasping the essence of these matters.

The resolutions of this party congress involve the following basic matters:

1. The general situation and tasks.
2. The economic and social guidelines, tasks and main objectives for the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and for the 1980's.
3. The cultural and social tasks.
4. Strengthening the socialist state and launching revolutionary movements of the masses.
5. The world situation and the foreign policy of our party and state.
6. Party building.

You must carefully study the matters mentioned above in the proceedings of the congress. To help you grasp the basic matters contained within the resolutions, I will elaborate upon a number of points that were thoroughly debated at the congress.

1. The evaluation of the situation in the recent past.

Over the past 5 years, many important events have occurred in our country. Our people have won many large victories and recorded numerous achievements in all areas; at the same time, they face many very complex problems and must deal with numerous difficulties. In the face of this situation, cadres and party members have expressed different opinions concerning many matters. Through the congresses on the various levels and this national congress, these opinions were gradually clarified through democratic debate and, in the end, unanimity was achieved. Unanimity has been raised to a new level and is more firmly based.

a) As regards the victories won over the past 5 years, there is much to discuss; however, the congress emphasized and confirmed: "The past 5 years have been recorded in the history of the nation as a stage of very glorious victories for the Vietnamese revolution."(5)

In order to shed light on this viewpoint, the congress thoroughly analyzed every aspect of the country's situation. Living in a country that was heavily damaged in a fierce and long war carried out by imperialism, our people "overcame towering difficulties."(6) We rapidly reunified the country in terms of state administration; promulgated the new Constitution, established the dictatorship of the proletariat system throughout the country; defeated two wars of aggression launched by Chinese expansionism and hegemony; restored, transformed and built the economy; transformed and developed the culture; maintained political security; strengthened the militant alliance and established the strong united position of the revolutions of the three countries of Indochina; strengthened our militant unity and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries; and increased the influence of the Vietnamese revolution and elevated the position of our country in the international arena.

Here, we must fully realize the significance of the victories of our people's two wars to defend the fatherland to the nation, to socialism, to Southeast Asia and to the world. These victories were extremely important. Let us review the situation in an objective manner: if our army and people did not win victory, in these tests of strength, the situation of our country and the Indochina situation would still be very difficult situations.

The victories mentioned above plus the fact that we "developed the Vietnamese revolution on the basis of a new and more solid strategic position created greater capabilities for defending the fatherland and successfully building socialism."(7)

b) With regard to the leadership role of the party as one of the reasons for these victories, the congress confirmed: "These victories were won as a result of the firm leadership of our party, a party that was founded and forged by President Ho Chi Minh and has boundless loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, to the destiny of the nation and the undertaking of the people," of the Party Central Committee headed by General Secretary

Le Duan. "The winning of these victories proves that the line set forth in the resolutions of the 4th Congress of the Party and the resolutions of the Party Central Committee was correct."(8)

c) With a high spirit of responsibility and a serious attitude toward self-criticism and criticism, the congress unanimously agreed with the observation of the 4th Party Central Committee that during the past 5 years, besides the tremendous victories of the revolution and the many achievements that were recorded, we also "encountered very many difficulties; and, at present, on the economic front, our country is facing many acute problems."(9) The congress unanimously agreed that these difficulties have their origins in objective causes; however, on the other hand, there are also difficulties caused by shortcomings and mistakes on the part of the agencies of our party and state from the central level to the basic level, shortcomings and mistakes involving the leadership and management of the economy and the management of society. "In certain areas, the shortcomings and mistakes regarding leadership and management are the main causes of or have exacerbated the economic and social difficulties of the past several years."(10)

Of utmost importance in the self-criticism and criticism practiced by a genuine Marxist-Leninist party is to precisely analyze strongpoints and shortcomings, victories and problems in order to learn useful lessons, strengthen the solidarity and unanimity within the party and among the people, raise the level of leadership of the party, improve the management ability of the state and heighten our will and determination to struggle to complete the weighty tasks of the revolution in the years ahead.

d) Concerning the matter of "firmly maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat," the congress reviewed and debated this matter and observed: compared to the specifics and requirements involved in firmly maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat that were stated in the resolutions of the 4th Party Congress, our party has, over the past 5 years and more, led all the people and the entire army in performing very many jobs and winning large and basic victories; at the same time, there have also been specific shortcomings and mistakes in a number of areas. These shortcomings and mistakes have also been due to our failure to "maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat" well and fully. Thus, we have been lax in maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat regarding the specific matters that were reviewed, not regarding all matters. Therefore, the resolutions do not make the general statement that we have been "lax in maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat," rather, they deal directly with specific shortcomings and mistakes. This method of dealing with the problem is precise and provides practical guidance of the effort to develop specific guidelines and measures for effectively overcoming shortcomings and mistakes and doing a better job of firmly maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat. It would have been incorrect to generally state that "we have been lax in maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat" because, if this were true, political power would have surely fallen into the hands of another

class by now, our party would not have been able to maintain its leadership position and the revolutionary achievements that we have recorded would no longer exist.

2. The two strategic tasks and the development of the revolution.

a) This time, the congress thoroughly analyzed and evaluated the country's situation. The congress observed: "Our country is in a situation in which it is at peace but must contend with a multi-faceted war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists; at the same time, we must be ready to deal with the situation in which the enemy could launch a large-scale war of aggression."(11)

On the basis of the observation mentioned above, our party has confirmed that following the total liberation of the South and the completion of the people's national democratic revolution throughout the country, our country's revolution entered a new stage: the stage of carrying out the socialist revolution in independent and unified Vietnam. Our party has been and is implementing the strategy of the socialist revolution, which involves two strategic tasks:

First, successfully building socialism;

Secondly, maintaining combat readiness and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

As regards the international task, the congress stated that for more than one-half century, especially since the August Revolution and the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, our party, state and people have always fulfilled their national task as well as their international task, especially regarding the Lao revolution and the Kampuchean revolution; "the Leninist foreign policy proposed and steadfastly pursued by President Ho Chi Minh has been an integral part of the strategy and policy of the party in all periods of development of the Vietnamese revolution."(12) In the present world situation, the congress continued to affirm the glorious international obligation and task of our party, state and people, confirm our party's foreign policy based on principle and this, which was clearly stated in the Political Report of the Party Central Committee to the Congress, is consistent with specific historic circumstances.

b) As regards socialist construction, the congress confirmed: "We must continue to implement the line on the socialist revolution and the line on building the socialist economy that were set forth by the 4th Congress of the Party."(13) These lines guide every activity of our entire party, all our people and our entire army throughout the period of transition to socialism. Our period of transition involves the process of advancing from a society in which small-scale production predominates, bypassing the stage of capitalist development and advancing directly to socialism, advancing from predominantly manual production to socialist, mechanized heavy industrial production. Therefore, we state: "Socialist

industrialization is the central task throughout the entire period of transition to socialism."(14)

This is our correct understanding of the period of transition to socialism, the period of struggle between socialism and capitalism to resolve the question of "who defeats whom," the period of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production.

The congress confirmed: "The general line and the economic line are an entity in which several matters must be given special attention: firmly maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat, building the system of collective ownership of the laboring people and carrying out socialist industrialization."(15) We must firmly maintain the unity and completeness of the line. Emphasizing the several matters to which special attention must be given does not mean separating them from the line, which is always a unified and complete entity, rather, the purpose of emphasizing these matters is to state that every element of the line of the party must be implemented with the same thorough spirit that these matters to which special attention must be given are implemented.

The realities of the past several years have shown that in order to win victory and move the revolution strongly forward, the first requirement of us is to firmly grasp, correctly understand, concretize and successfully implement the line of the party. As the situation becomes increasingly difficult and complex, the more we must firmly grasp, correctly understand, concretize and successfully implement the line. At present, the enemy is looking for every way to sabotage our people's revolution, primarily by distorting the lines and policies of the party, creating doubt and looking for every way to undermine the implementation of this line and these policies. Therefore, it is even more necessary for us to firmly grasp and correctly understand the line, to display high vigilance, to promptly crush their insidious schemes and tricks and to firmly protect and resolutely implement the line of the party.

c) In order to continue to implement the line set forth by the 4th Congress, this congress pointed out the need to concretize the line of the party and set forth a socio-economic strategy for the initial stage of the process of socialist industrialization. The congress clearly stated: "The first stage, which encompasses the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and lasts until 1990, is a period of special importance."(16)

The economic strategy, which consists of a system of major objectives, policies and measures regarding building and developing the economy and the strategy for building, transforming and developing each sector, establishes a correct economic and social management system and a system of specific, long-term, 5 year and yearly economic plans. Correctly defining all of these matters is a very difficult; therefore, establishing the complete economic strategy is a major project, one that requires basic, detailed research on the part of many forces and requires time. For this reason, the congress realized that establishing a

complete economic strategy consisting of quantitative objectives requires detailed research conducted after the congress. On the basis of what it learned about the situation in the time allowed, this congress focused its efforts on researching and deciding matters regarding the principles and guiding thinking in formulating the long-term, 5 year and yearly plans and the principles and guiding thinking involved in formulating specific strategies for each economic sector. In other words, it only set forth targets, set forth major policies and measures to serve as the foundation for researching and defining the complete economic strategy following the congress.

Four objectives of the socio-economic strategy are contained within the resolutions of the congress. They are general objectives for the 1980's and objectives designed to effectively resolve the burning questions now being faced. The achievement of these four objectives will bring about a basic change in the state of the country's economy. In order to achieve these four objectives, we must implement, in a well coordinated and effective manner, the 10 major socio-economic policies and measures set forth by the congress. "We must create a new production force and a higher social labor productivity even though we do not yet have a relatively complete system of heavy industry." (17) The 10 major policies and measures revolve around utilizing and developing upon, in the best possible manner, our valuable assets, namely, our labor, arable land and trades; practicing strict economy, considering the practice of economy to be a national policy; and developing every existing capability and domestic potential first while utilizing the tremendous impact of international cooperation, primarily comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other countries with CEMA and cooperation and mutual assistance with Laos and Kampuchea in order to build and develop the economy of our country and the economies of the three countries of Indochina, considering this to be the basic factor in the nature of a law in carrying out socialist industrialization. As regards other countries, we must endeavor to develop commercial relations, economic cooperation and scientific-technical cooperation on the basis of the principle of maintaining our independence and sovereignty and benefiting both sides.

In the 10 major policies and measures, the matter of especially important significance is that of defining the specifics involved in socialist industrialization in the 1980's. After researching the opinions contributed by the party congresses on the various levels, the national congress of delegates of the party decided: "...During the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and in the 1980's, efforts must be focused upon strongly developing agriculture, considering agriculture to be the foremost front, and advancing agriculture one step toward large-scale socialist production while making every effort to accelerate consumer goods production and continuing to build a number of important heavy industrial sectors; and coordinating agriculture, the consumer goods industry and heavy industry within an efficient industrial-agricultural structure. These are the main elements of socialist industrialization in the immediate stage." (18)

As regards the matter of advancing agriculture one step toward large-scale socialist production, the congress stated that it is necessary to arrange

agriculture so that production and product distribution are carried out in accordance with the planning and plan of the entire country; accelerate the scientific - technological revolution within agriculture; complete socialist transformation in accordance with correct forms and stages; use the district as the main base for meeting the three requirements mentioned above; and taking positive steps to build the districts along the lines of agro-industrial, forestry-agricultural-industrial or fishing-agricultural-industrial districts depending upon the conditions of each type district.

Concretizing the economic line for the initial stage was the primary subject for which the congress allocated much time to discuss and correctly decide. This was a major victory of the congress, one that proved that our party has further matured in its economic leadership.

3. A number of matters related to the mechanism "the party leads, the people exercise ownership and the state manages."

The national congress emphasized: in the face of the weighty historic tasks that the party must undertake and in the face of attacks by the various types of enemies, it is absolutely necessary to make the party truly solid and strong and successfully bring about a truly strong change in the quality of leadership while increasing the fighting strength of the party.

Strengthening the party's leadership role is a necessity in the nature of a law in socialist construction. The key aspects of the requirement of strengthening the leadership of the party are improving the party's style of leadership and establishing correct relationships among the party, the state and the various mass organizations within the Vietnam Fatherland Front. In particular, we must improve the method of leading the state and improve the leadership ability and effectiveness of the party in every area, primarily with regard to economic leadership.

The matter of establishing and upholding the right of collective ownership of the laboring people is a matter of decisive importance in successfully performing each revolutionary task in the new stage. The highest manifestations of the sense of collective ownership of the people are patriotism and the love of socialism, are respecting the socialist system of law, voluntarily fulfilling each obligation of the citizen and correctly exercising the rights defined by the new Constitution:

--Exercising ownership by means of the state, first and primarily by means of the elected agencies (the National Assembly and the People's Councils on the various levels);

--Exercising ownership by means of the various social organizations: the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the member organizations of the front;

--Exercising direct ownership on the basic level (enterprise, cooperative, village, ward, collective housing area and so forth).

As regards the state, the delegates attending the congress were unanimous in their definition of the specifics involved in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat state: to begin with, it is necessary to develop the role and increase the effectiveness of the National Assembly and the People's Councils on the various levels. We must strengthen the Council of State (which is the highest agency of the National Assembly that conducts regular activities and is, at the same time, the collective president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam); must strengthen the Council of Ministers (the highest executive and administrative agency of the state); and must strengthen the people's committees on the various levels (the executive and administrative agencies on the local level) and all state management agencies in the fields of politics, economics, culture, society, national defense, security and so forth, with the most important requirement being revamping the organization and activities of the economic management agencies. We must strengthen the socialist system of law, considering this to be a pressing requirement in increasing the management effectiveness of the state and guaranteeing the right of collective ownership of the laboring people.

4. Party building.

a) The congress unanimously evaluated the party's situation and the ideological and organizational work of the party since the 4th National Congress, which were presented in the report on party building by the 4th Party Central Committee to the Congress.

The congress completely agreed with and confirmed that our party, which was founded and forged by President Ho and "is a determined Marxist-Leninist party that firmly adheres to the line, organized and led our people in overcoming every serious challenge facing the country and has always displayed the revolutionary-offensive spirit in order to constantly advance the revolution." (19) The congress emphasized: the steadfastness of the party in retaliating against every scheme and act of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and its steadfastness in advancing the socialist revolution without wavering or withdrawing in the face of challenges in order to adhere to the correct line of the party have been a strength and a major lesson and experience of our party.

The congress observed: "Our party has brandished the banner of national independence and socialism, smoothly combined genuine patriotism with pure proletarian internationalism and made a great effort to fulfill its international obligation." (20)

In the spirit of genuine socialist patriotism and a profound spirit of proletarian internationalism and employing revolutionary and scientific methods, the Party Central Committee adopted determined and wise strategic policies and made accurate and timely decisions in order to join the fraternal people of Kampuchea in smashing the genocidal regime. On this basis, it strengthened the militant alliance and established an unprecedented united position of the revolutions of the three countries of Indochina.

In the spirit of genuine patriotism and a profound spirit of proletarian internationalism, our party brought a new level of quality to the militant

solidarity and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union, the citadel of world revolution and peace, and made every effort to strengthen our militant solidarity and fraternal cooperation with the other countries of the socialist community.

The tremendous victories of historic significance in the two wars to defend the fatherland, victories which the congress confirmed, were also victories of the smooth coordination between genuine patriotism and profound proletarian internationalism. We realize the historic significance of these victories and, as has been the case with the historic victory of the spring of 1975, the victories of the two wars to defend the fatherland against the Chinese expansionist aggressors in recent years surely will not only provide extremely valuable experiences to our people in order to continue the struggle to build and defend the socialist fatherland, but will also be of immeasurable significance in and have an immeasurable impact upon the cause of resisting expansionism and hegemony and opposing all national oppression of the peoples of many countries of the world.

We must give cadres, party members and soldiers a clear understanding of the tremendous significance and the historic nature of these victories. A number of specific shortcomings should not be allowed to diminish the importance of this great lesson and experience.

The congress wholeheartedly congratulated the Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau, headed by the revered General Secretary Le Duan, for the clear-sightedness of our Party Central Committee in this historic event and warmly praised the entire party, the entire army and all our people for their selfless sacrifices in the cause of defending the fatherland and fulfilling this noble proletarian international obligation.

The congress forthrightly pointed out the specific shortcomings and mistakes of the party in leading and managing the economy and society. We cannot give light attention to shortcomings but we must also realize that through these difficulties our party has grown. As Lenin said: "Today, we would never have been able to learn how to perform our tasks by new methods if the experience of yesterday had not opened our eyes and shown us the mistakes of our old methods"(Lenin: "Complete Works," Volume 44, Progress Publishing House, Moscow, 1978, p 255). Therefore, realizing our old shortcomings and finding ways to correct them are a sign of growth.

b) The common task regarding party building.

The party defined the key task of party building as: "Continuing to increase the working class nature and the vanguard nature of the party and building a party that is strong and solid politically, ideologically and organizationally on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism with a view toward insuring the successful implementation of the party's line, improving the leadership ability and effectiveness

of the party in socialist construction and the defense of the fatherland and insuring that our party always maintains its revolutionary and scientific nature, is always a very pure party that possesses high fighting strength and is close to the masses."(21)

The purpose of increasing the party's ability to lead socialist construction and the defense of the fatherland must be to insure victory in the struggle between the two ways of life, successfully meet the economic and social objectives that have been established and win victory in the fight against the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

The congress established specific tasks regarding strengthening the ideological front and tasks and policies regarding perfecting the organizational structure and building the corps of party members in order to meet the requirements of the two strategic tasks. Concerning the corps of party members, the congress stated that "we must, on the basis of the requirements regarding the qualities and abilities of party members in the new period, make every effort to improve the quality of party members. Every party member, regardless of his occupation, be he a manual worker or civil servant of the state, a cooperative member or a soldier in the army, the public security force...must possess the qualities and abilities of a communist fighter."(22) The important aspect of the qualifications of a communist party member lie in possessing ideals and knowing how to act in accordance with the line of the party; a communist party member cannot be a person who possesses ideals but does not engage in revolutionary activities in accordance with the party line. The congress also emphasized:"the need to continue to expand the ranks of the party by accepting many new party members of high quality"(23); at the same time, "in order to keep the corps of the party pure, it is necessary, following this congress, to take determined steps to expel from the party, the sooner the better, all opportunists, all persons who have lost their revolutionary will and all exploiters, smugglers, profiteers and persons who engage in misappropriation, bribery and intimidation of the masses. Party members who possess a very low level of awareness and have been educated by the party organization but still not made progress must also be expelled from the party."(24) This work must be performed in a determined, urgent manner without rightism, hesitation or wavering; however, this work must be closely guided and it is necessary to guard against deviations. The congress also decided that it is necessary to make improvements in many areas of cadre work, necessary to increase the revolutionary and scientific nature of cadre work in order to meet the requirements of the cadre work of the party in the new stage.

The congress defined in detail the mechanism "the party leads, the people exercise ownership and the state manages." The task and requirements involved in party building are designed to improve the quality of leadership and improve the leadership ability and effectiveness of the party, primarily in economic leadership. Thoroughly understanding and strictly complying with the matters regarding the mechanism "the party leads, the people exercise ownership and the state manages" and the specifics and requirements involved in party building

as set forth in the proceedings of the congress will bring about a change in the situation and overcome our present weaknesses in economic management.

Dear Comrades,

The 5th National Congress of Delegates of the Party debated and adopted resolutions concerning the Political Report and the report on party building of the Party Central Committee and the economic and social guidelines, tasks and main objectives for the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and for the 1980's. These resolutions contain the basic matters and major ideological viewpoints of the party, which you will carefully study. Today, I have only discussed briefly with you a number of these points for the purpose of helping you study and gain a thorough understanding of the resolutions of the congress and make every effort to turn them into actions on the part of the entire army to excellently complete each task.

III. The Matters of Major Importance Upon Which Our Thinking Must Focus in Order To Concretize in the Form of Programs of Action of the Army To Implement the Resolutions of the 5th Party Congress

On the basis of the general line of the revolution and the national defense and people's war line of the party, we must develop them into programs of action for the army itself, must turn them into energy and feelings on the part of each unit, each cadre and each soldier and must make the greatest possible effort to excellently complete assigned tasks. This is the requirement of thoroughly understanding the line of the 5th Party Congress. To us, as the directive of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee pointed out, "it is first of all necessary to direct our efforts toward successfully carrying out the 1982 tasks and plan assigned by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and the Ministry of National Defense to the various units, develop upon our strengths, create many new factors, effectively overcome the weaknesses and negative aspects regarding our will to fight, maintain discipline, manage our forces, manage material-technical bases and care for the spiritual and material lives of troops." The directive on intensifying the campaign to "display the revolutionary nature and increase the fighting strength of the armed forces" also stated: "Efforts must be focused on bringing about true change in three areas: heightening our will and sense of responsibility; bringing about a change in the situation regarding troop discipline; and improving the material, spiritual and cultural lives of cadres and soldiers."

At this conference and when you return to your units, you must give thought to relating the resolutions of the congress to military and national defense matters so that you can contribute opinions to the Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defense; however, of main importance is the need for you to think about what you, your sector and your unit should do in order to adopt a program of action, adopt plans and measures for successfully implementing the resolutions of the congress.

We must focus our efforts on the following matters of major importance:

--The matter of performing the two strategic tasks and the relationship between these two tasks: as regards the entire army and all the people, the foremost task is to successfully build socialism; however, the army must recognize that its foremost task is maintaining combat readiness and firmly defending the socialist fatherland. In order to perform this foremost task, what must our army, in general, and each unit, in particular, do, on what should they focus their efforts in order to join the agencies of the state, the various sectors and levels and all the people in taking determined steps to win victory over the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy and maintain political security and social order and safety well while insuring that they possess the strength needed to win victory over the enemy in any situation?

--The matter of the army participating in the buildup of a comprehensive and modern national defense system of all the people and developing the fullest possible combined strength for the purpose of defending the fatherland. What must the entire army do? What must each unit do and how should it do it in order to meet the requirements of this task?

--The matter of building the people's armed forces in accordance with the viewpoint of a national defense system of all the people and the people's war, building people's armed forces that consist of main force troops and local troops, that have a structure that is balanced and well coordinated between regular forces and reserve forces, that have the necessary size and increasingly high quality...as stated in the congress resolutions. Which jobs we must perform and how we must perform them in order to comply with the resolutions are the general matters about which we must think and which we must resolve in a detailed manner consistent with reality.

As regards building the army, we must also give much thought to which jobs we must perform and how we should perform them in order to meet the objectives established by the congress, namely, building our army "into a revolutionary people's army that possesses an unshakeable determination to win, strict discipline and a serious style, an army that is increasingly regular force and modern in nature, that constantly raises its level of combat readiness and that always fulfills every task assigned by the fatherland"(25) while effectively overcoming present weaknesses.

--The matter of building the corps of cadres is the matter of important and pressing significance in the present task of building the army. Which jobs we must perform and how we should perform them in order to build the corps of cadres of the people's army in exact accordance with the requirements and spirit of the resolution of the 5th Party Congress concerning cadre work and in a manner consistent with the requirements of the tasks of the people's armed forces in the new stage of the revolution is a matter about which you must actively think in order to successfully adopt specific, practical and effective positions and measures in your program of action to implement the congress resolution.

--The matter of the relationship between the economy and the national defense system, the national defense system and the economy, the matter of the army participating in productive labor and economic construction in a suitable and effective manner and so forth; how should we understand and implement these matters? What must the entire army do? What must each unit do? These matters must be correctly understood and turned into specific actions in order to achieve implementation.

--The matter of being the master of science and technology within the army, the matter of managing the material bases within the army, the matter of practicing economy within the army and so forth are also matters that we must define in detail and incorporate in the form of plans, positions and measures to be implemented throughout the army and within each unit.

--The matter of strengthening the socialist system of law and resolving the present discipline situation well: these are matters that we have discussed many times but concerning which change has occurred slowly. Is this because we lack effective measures or because we lack an effective management mechanism? We must display a high sense of responsibility and find the key to resolving this problem.

--The matter of building the party within the army: in order to provide a thorough understanding of the resolutions of the congress, how must we perform ideological and organizational work of the party within the army? How should we build the basic organizations of the party, build the corps of party members and cadres so that the party is truly strong and solid, is pure and possesses high fighting strength? To begin with, we must focus our efforts on looking for every way to successfully build strong, solid and pure basic party organizations and bring about a true and marked change from the basic organizations of the party upward.

--The matter of organizing the lives of troops: this is also a necessary and pressing problem that must be resolved. We must rapidly improve the spiritual and material lives of troops. We must immerse ourselves in activities designed to bring about a change in the situation, must meet one small target at a time and then move forward, forward from performing specific jobs in the lives and combat of soldiers in order to fulfill the slogan "for the socialist fatherland, for the happiness of the people."

The above are several matters that I have raised so that you will think about them and work together to find solutions when adopting programs of action for the entire army as well as each unit to implement the resolutions of the congress.

Finally, I would like to repeat three points deserving of special attention:

1. Clearly recognizing the victory and success of the congress involves a struggle; they cannot be fully recognized by merely studying or explaining them once. Study and explanation must be repeated many time by means of many

different forms and measures in order to give each cadre and soldier a thorough understanding of this matter.

2. A thorough understanding of the resolutions of the congress must be expressed by means of organizing the successful implementation of these resolutions. This also involves implementing the party's principle of democratic centralism.

3. We must relate the resolutions of the congress to the situation and tasks of the armed forces, the situation and task of each unit, in order to implement them. We must struggle, engage in practical activities, bring about a strong change in the situation of units and more effectively perform the tasks that are assigned, thereby helping to successfully implement all aspects of the resolutions of the congress.

By being tightly united, being confident and enthusiastic, by thoroughly understanding and making every effort to implement the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the Party in order to fully implement the sacred Testament of the revered President Ho, we will surely successfully build socialism and firmly defend the socialist fatherland and our army will surely excellently complete the tasks assigned to it by the party and people.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the 5th Congress of the Party.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. The Report on Party Building at the 5th Congress of the Party.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. The Political Report at the 5th Congress of the Party.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SENIOR GENERAL HOANG VAN THAI ARTICLE ON CADRE WORK

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 6 Jun 82 pp 19-35

[Article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Successfully Performing the Task of Cadre Work Within the People's Armed Forces Under the Light of the Resolution of the 5th Congress of the Party"]

[Text] The 5th Congress of our party set forth strategic tasks in the struggle to build socialism and defend the fatherland, set forth the economic and social guidelines, tasks and main objectives for the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and for the 1980's and decided important matters regarding ideological work and organizational work with a view toward insuring the successful implementation of the line and tasks established by the congress.

The Political Report as well as the report on Party Building thoroughly evaluated the situation surrounding the corps of cadres and cadre work and presented, in a basic and comprehensive manner, major viewpoints and policies regarding cadre work in the years ahead.

In the recent past, under the light of the 4th Congress of the Party and the resolutions of the Party Central Committee and in the process of preparing for the 5th Congress of the Party, the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee issued two important resolutions on cadre work: the long-term planning resolution regarding the building of the corps of cadres and the resolution on cadre work for the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 within the armed forces.

The resolutions on party work of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee represent the concretization of the cadre work line and task of the party within the armed forces. Struggling to successfully implement the cadre work policies set forth by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee also means struggling to implement the cadre work line and policy of the party.

As a result, firmly adhering to the basic viewpoints and the policies and tasks regarding building the corps of cadres and cadre work that were set forth by the 5th Congress of the Party is of decisive significance in building and training the corps of cadres as well as in all of the cadre work of the people's armed forces.

The Basic Viewpoints and Policies of the Party Regarding Cadre Work at the 5th Congress

Once a line and policies have been adopted, the corps of cadres is the force that plays the decisive role in organizing action on the part of the masses and turning the line and policies of the party into real victory.

Because cadre work is so important, President Ho always considered "cadres to be the foundation of every job"(1) and always considered "the success or failure of a job to depend upon whether cadres are competent or incompetent."(2)

Our party has always considered building the corps of cadres of the party in the various areas of practical activities to be one of the matters of decisive importance to the entire revolutionary undertaking.

The purpose of building the corps of cadres is to organize the successful implementation of the line and policies and is carried out on the basis of this line and these policies. Every stage of the revolution demands a corresponding corps of cadres. In the final analysis, cadres are determined by the cadre policy, by cadre work. As a result, in order to build a corps of cadres that meets the requirements of the revolutionary line and tasks, cadre work must reflect initiative and farsightedness and must be conducted before requirements arise.

As we entered the period of carrying out the socialist revolution on a nationwide scale, the 4th Congress of the Party set forth the line on the socialist revolution and the line on building the socialist economy in our country during the period of transition; at the same time, it also established the cadre work line and task in the new stage.

The more than 5 years spent implementing the resolutions of the 4th Congress of the Party in the face of victories and setbacks in the effort to concretize the line and in the effort to organize the implementation of the line of the party have given our party an even deeper understanding of the role and position of building the corps of cadres and of cadre work. The Report on Party Building presented at the 5th Congress of the Party pointed out: "As the work of carrying out the socialist revolution and defending the fatherland becomes increasingly complex and the leadership role of the party increases, the decisive position of cadre work, especially of the training and deployment of the corps of key cadres, will become increasingly large. Actual experience has shown that the accuracy of the line and policies and the success of the implementation of this line and these policies depend, in the final analysis, upon the quality of cadre work."

The struggle to resolve the question of "who defeats whom" in the initial stage of the period of transition in our country is facing us with very new and complex tasks and problems. New forms of organization are taking shape, the new mode of management is gradually being perfected, the corps of cadres is developing

in an increasingly diverse manner, encompassing all types of cadres, all sectors and so forth. These developments make it a necessity that we quickly train and deploy cadres in accordance with the new requirements. Consequently, "our party must devote much of its effort to building the corps of cadres of the party and state, primarily the corps of leadership cadres and management cadres."(3)

As regards the matter of building the corps of cadres, "the quality of cadres determines the success of leadership work "(4), determines the success of tasks and the success of shifting to a new stage and improving the management mechanism.

On the basis of analyzing the characteristics of the situation and on the basis of the two strategic tasks of the revolution as well as the party building task, the 5th Congress of the Party established the requirements of the cadre work task in the new stage as: "On the basis of planning, improving the elementary and advanced training of cadres, correctly deploying and insuring succession in the building of the contingent of core cadres and making every effort to improve the qualities and the abilities of the corps of cadres to insure the dependability of the party in every situation. This is extremely important to the long-range revolutionary undertaking of our party."(5) Of decisive and overriding significance in meeting these requirements is the need to "train, correctly deploy and improve, in accordance with cadre planning, the core of key cadres from top to bottom."

On the basis of evaluating the corps of cadres, the strengths and weaknesses of cadre work and the requirements, tasks and experiences in building the corps of cadres, the 5th Congress of the Party set forth four specific tasks regarding cadre work in the years ahead.

First, it is necessary to constantly be concerned with formulating and implementing cadre training planning and plans.

To have an adequate number of high quality cadres in order to take the initiative in meeting the requirements of tasks, it is of basic importance to conduct cadre planning and, on this basis, plan the training of cadres in accordance with immediate and long-range requirements, not merely for the next 5 or 10 years, but even further. This is the central element of the entirety of cadre work.

The training of the corps of cadres is of foremost significance and determines the quality of the corps of cadres.

The main source of cadres for training are cadres who have participated in production and combat; persons who show prospects at installations, in the movement and in the day-to-day work of each sector should be selected for training. The trainee recruiting plan for each sector, each level and each unit is basically the plan for distributing cadres to the sectors, levels and units. The plans for the recruiting of students for training schools must be improved.

Besides training new cadres, we must urgently train key cadres now on the job who have not been trained under a suitable program. For the sake of the interests of the revolution and the corps of cadres, we must be determined to send management

cadres and reserve cadres for elementary and advanced training in accordance with plans and must put an end to the practices of sending secondary cadres in their place simply because the cadres who should be attending training are "busy," sending unqualified cadres for training or sending cadres who have not been assigned a job.

Training plans and the process of the elementary and advanced training of cadres must reflect coordination and balance among the various types of cadres, among the various sectors, levels and so forth, thereby overcoming the practice of training cadres in a sweeping fashion and not giving attention to the returns from training.

Secondly, it is necessary to urgently reassign and redeploy cadres. A clearcut decision must be made in order to bring about a change in organization and personnel, which clearly have not met the requirements of tasks, primarily with regard to the management cadres of the various levels, sectors and important agencies and units.

Every political task demands a suitable organization and a suitable corps of cadres. As a result, it is necessary to establish the organization and to deploy and assign cadres entirely on the basis of the political task, of work, of economic-technical requirements; we must avoid the practice of transferring a cadre from one position to another position on a similar level when he commits a shortcoming or transferring a cadre from one sector to another while giving little attention to promoting another cadre from within the sector, which results in many cadres not having an actual job to perform or not being suited to their work.

We must consider "cadres moving upward or downward" to be normal in the deployment and assignment of cadres. We must place the interests of the work at hand above everything else. We should not waver in the deploying of cadres as a result of trying to save face, relying on sentiment or because of one's "reputation" or "merit." Cadres who possess good qualities and abilities and who are deemed to truly be able to undertake a new task should be promoted to a level or position higher than they would normally be promoted.

It can be said that these are matters of principle, of viewpoint of the party in the deployment and assignment of cadres. We must have a full and correct understanding of these principles and viewpoint in order to bring about a new, strong change in the deployment and assignment of cadres, in order to develop the talents of cadres and the strength of the organization...

Cadre standards determine the quality of the corps of cadres; therefore, we must have a firm grasp of the party's viewpoint concerning cadre standards.

As regards the key leadership cadres of the various levels, sectors and units, full and appropriate attention must be given to political standards, specialized

standards and leadership ability but the results of their work must be the final measurement of standards.

The Report on Party Building at the 5th Congress of the Party set forth the fundamentals of the political standards, specialized standards and leadership ability of the cadre. These standards must be concretized in a manner consistent with the specific political task of each sector, field and unit.

Thirdly, we must improve the methods of selecting and managing cadres.

The correct political line, the correct cadre line of the party are the primary prerequisites that firmly support the building of the corps of cadres. However, this result also depends, to an important degree, upon the methods used to select and manage cadres.

The situation surrounding the corps of cadres and the requirements of cadres are always developing in keeping with the development of revolutionary tasks. Cadre work cannot stop, rather, it must constantly involve creativity and research regarding its work methods. As a result, improving the methods used to select and manage cadres in a manner consistent with the new situation and tasks is a completely accurate decision.

While improving the methods used to select and manage cadres, we must firmly adhere to an extremely important principle set forth by the Party Congress: "Insuring the collective leadership and right of collective decision-making of the party organization regarding the promotion of key cadres and strictly implementing the principle of democratic centralism in the promotion and selection of cadres as well as disciplinary action against cadres."(6)

Cadre management must correctly implement the following principle: the management of persons must be closely linked to the management and inspection of work. It is necessary to maintain a serious, objective and loyal attitude in the evaluation and appraisal of cadres. It is necessary to meet with cadres in order to understand them and learn about their work. The deployment and promotion of cadres must comply with regulations and be based on the coordination of self-criticism by the cadre with appraisals by the person in charge and the cadre management agency and the opinions of other cadres, party members and the masses.

In order to manage cadres well, we must, in conjunction with strengthening the leadership of the party, also attach importance to improving the quality of the corps of cadres engaged in cadre work and strengthen cadre management agencies.

Above everything else, we must strengthen the cadre agencies of the various sectors, levels and units so that they are strong enough to help the party committee echelon manage cadres, primarily key cadres. The person in charge must directly manage subordinate cadres and avoid leaving this up to the agency. Cadres on the upper level and leadership cadres must personally help and train cadres on the lower level and young cadres and must promptly discover and train

in a planned manner cadres who show prospects in order to prepare them for key positions. We must be imbued with the words spoken by Le Duan, general secretary of the party: "Our loyalty to the revolution is not only seen in our completion of the tasks assigned to us, but also in always creating for the revolution a stratum of successors who are capable of advancing the cause of the revolution to the final objective."(?) Only in this way can we train an abundant corps of successor cadres who are capable of successfully performing each task of the party in any situation.

Fourthly, we must systematically improve the policies and regulations governing the remuneration and praise of cadres to be consistent with the new management mechanism and the new position of organizations with a view toward providing incentive for the development of the talents of cadres.

Constantly being concerned with the spiritual and material lives of cadres is a major viewpoint and major policy of the party and state regarding cadres.

The improvement and implementation of policies and regulations regarding remuneration and praise for cadres must be based on the viewpoint of the party and be consistent with the development of the economy and the socio-political situation of the country. We can never be conservative or backward nor can we be subjective and impetuous. In the Report on Party Building at the 5th Congress, it stated that the party must attach importance to caring for the spiritual and material lives of those cadres who have been active for many years, cadres who have performed a service and retired cadres by means of specific regulations and policies; an organization must be established to implement and inspect the implementation of these regulations and policies. We must adopt specific policies and regulations with a view toward developing the long-range impact of the skilled specialists in each field. We must cancel outmoded regulations and policies and amend and perfect new regulations and policies in order to mobilize and develop each talent of cadres. We must be concerned with building the corps of basic level cadres and with formulating basic level cadre remuneration policies and regulations that are consistent with the importance and nature of the basic level at this time.

The cadre work task and policy of the party, which were set forth by the 5th Congress, reflect the basic viewpoints of the party as regards building the corps of cadres and reflect the determination of the party in performing practical organizational work with a view toward building the corps of cadres of the party and state in a manner commensurate with the requirements and tasks of the revolution in the new stage.

In cadre work, the matter of improving the quality of the corps of cadres and the matter of improving the quality of cadre work are organically linked to each other and are considered to be one of the decisive factors in the success of the entire effort to build the corps of cadres.

Deeply understanding the basic viewpoints of the party and the major policies of the party regarding cadre work and endeavoring to turn these viewpoints and policies into reality are the responsibility of the entire party, of the various sectors, levels and organizations and of each cadre and party member.

Struggling To Successfully Implement the 1981-1985 Five Year Cadre Plan and the 1982 Cadre Plan

The 1981-1985 five year cadre plan of the Standing Committee of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and the 1982 cadre plan represent the concretization of the cadre work line and policies of the 5th Party Congress and are consistent with the realities of the situation, the tasks of the armed forces and the requirements involved in building the corps of cadres of the armed forces. Suceessfully implementing the 1981-1985 five year cadre plan and the 1982 cadre plan will help to turn the cadre work line and policy of the party into reality; at the same time, it will involve a process of constantly concretizing and perfecting the cadre work line and policy of the party.

The cadre plan must be implemented in a comprehensive manner with efforts first concentrated upon the following several matters of primary importance:

1. Cadre planning and the cadre plan.

In compliance with the cadre work line and policy of the party over the past 5 years, many cadre work policies of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee began to be implemented, such as the Officers Service Law; the establishment of cadre duties and the standardization of cadres; the strengthening of the cadre agencies and the improvement of cadre work on the various levels; the reorientation of school activities and so forth.

At present, however, at a number of units, the matters of greatest importance, namely, formulating the 5-year plan and planning the assignment of key cadres, have still not been carried out or have not been carried out in an appropriate manner. It must be realized that in order to build a corps of cadres that is balanced and of high quality, it is of foremost importance to adopt a cadre plan and conduct cadre planning. This is a necessary requirement, primarily with regard to each military region, military corps, service and branch, each agency, institute and school.

The cadre plan and the planning of the assignment of key cadres on the military region, military corps, service and other levels must be formed from the division (and district) level upward and must involve many strata of successor cadres, the stratum of cadres now on the job, a stratum ready to replace them and a stratum that will be trained to replace other cadres beginning in 1986. This is a very large and very complicated job, one that requires keen strategic vision and requires delving deeply into each specific position and the qualifications of specific persons; it is not a job that can be performed in a general, simple fashion.

The cadre plan and cadre planning must first reflect the situation of our country at this time as pointed out by the Political Report: "We are at peace but must contend with the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists; at the same time, we must be ready to deal with the possibility that the enemy could launch a large-scale war of aggression." Under the leadership of the party, the entire army must join all the people in making every effort to fulfill the two strategic tasks of our country's revolution in the new stage: successfully building socialism while maintaining combat readiness and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. While maintaining combat readiness and fighting to defend the fatherland, our army must stand shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary armies of the fraternal peoples of Laos and Kampuchea to protect independence, freedom and socialism on the Indochina peninsula. As a result, the cadre plan and cadre planning cannot be static, rather, they must involve different plans for different situations and different capabilities in order to meet both immediate and long-range requirements.

The cadre plan and planning of each military region, military corps and so forth must not only be based on the common tasks of the entire army, but also on the specific task of each military region, military corps and service and so forth. Because the political tasks of each military region, military corps and service differ, the cadre plan and cadre planning at each place must be designed to competently support the effort to complete these different specific political tasks instead of being general in nature.

Thus, the cadre plan and cadre planning must be a scientific project, a project in the sciences of organization and management. Successfully formulating the cadre plan and cadre planning are an art, the art of leadership of the party committee echelon, the art of guiding the organization of implementation by the commander, the art of managing work by the cadre agency. To formulate a good cadre plan and cadre planning, it is not only necessary to possess a high spirit of political responsibility and have a firm grasp of the political line and task, the military line and task and the cadre work policy of the party, but also necessary to appraise and evaluate cadres in accordance with the revolutionary, scientific and developing viewpoints and with an extremely pure and unbiased attitude.

The cadre plan and cadre planning cannot be perfected all at once because they are constantly developing along with the development of the actual situation. Therefore, we must keep abreast of practice, must always supplement and improve the cadre plan and planning and must overcome the attitudes of complacency, conservatism and procrastination.

2. The elementary and advanced training of cadres.

Under the leadership of the party, the corps of cadres of our armed forces has matured rapidly, gained much experience throughout the 38 years of fighting and building and is worthy of its role as the key corps of the party within the people's armed forces.

However, in the present stage of our country's revolution, the buildup and combat tasks of our army are raising very high, new requirements regarding the abilities and qualities of cadres. The development of military science and art and the development of the military technical sciences in the people's war to defend the fatherland; the new requirements regarding the ability to lead, command organize and manage in a manner consistent with the new leadership and command mechanism; the knowledge needed to fulfill the tasks involved in the buildup and warfare of an increasingly regular-force, modern people's army and so forth are raising harsh demands regarding the qualifications and ability of our army's corps of cadres. On the other hand, it must be realized that due to the circumstances of the long, fierce war, our army's corps of cadres, although they have been forged and challenged much, more than a few cadres have been unable to receive basic and systematic training because of these circumstances; qualifications in all areas are still low compared to the requirements of tasks.

For this reason, the elementary and advanced training of cadres is a major and pressing issue.

There is a very close relationship between formulating the plan and planning and providing cadres with elementary and advanced training. Whereas the formulation of a plan and planning guides the elementary and advanced training of cadres, the successful elementary and advanced training of cadres will determine the success of the implementation of the plan and planning. Therefore, it can be said that the essence of the cadre plan and planning is the cadre training plan and planning. The resolution of the 5th Party Congress also pointed out that "we must first constantly concern ourselves with formulating the cadre training plan and planning" and consider "this to be the center of all cadre work."

Cadre training must be based on and meet the requirements of the plan and planning for the assignment of cadres and must take into consideration actual results in the buildup of the corps of cadres. However, at a number of units there is still the phenomenon of sending cadres who cannot be assigned jobs or who can only be assigned jobs with difficulty to elementary or supplementary education training and doing so only to meet the quantitative norms of the upper level. This incorrect practice has created additional difficulties for the elementary and advanced training of cadres. As the resolution of the 5th Party Congress pointed out, we "must determinedly send management cadres and reserve cadres to advanced training in accordance with plans and end the practice of sending secondary cadres in their place because the cadres who should attend training are busy with work."

In order for the elementary and advanced training of cadres to meet the requirement of raising the qualifications of cadres in a basic and systematic manner, we must first attach importance to and urgently strengthen the system of schools within the army in exact accordance with the educational reform guidelines of the Political Bureau and the resolution of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee concerning school activities.

The reorganization, consolidation and strengthening of the army's school system must have the purpose of supporting the requirements of training both regular cadres and reserve cadres, both quantitative and qualitative requirements. To accomplish this, we must work hard for many years to build schools that have clearly defined objectives, tasks and specialized training sectors; a scientific organization and staff; tight and appropriate student recruiting procedures to insure adequate enrollment and compliance with prescribed standards; a corps of teachers and management cadres of adequate size, a corps that is balanced and well coordinated in terms of its structure and possesses high quality and professional qualifications, a corps that has leading sector cadres for all faculties and subjects; have complete, modern material bases and equipment before the unit acquires them and have necessary textbooks, curricula, lessons and reference material.

In the immediate future, the system of army academies and schools must focus its efforts on successfully completing the jobs of improving training programs, subject matter, plans and methods; providing elementary and advanced training to management cadres and instructors; actively making preparations in every area for putting the recruiting of trainees under regulations; building material bases and acquiring additional teaching and study aids; and strengthening the guidance of schools by the various levels. These are the main and basic jobs that must be completed during the years from 1981 to 1985.

In conjunction with strengthening the school system and improving the quality of classroom cadre training, positive steps must be taken to strengthen the on-the-job training organization and accelerate the advanced on-the-job training of cadres.

Cadre training requirements are very large. Even if it is strengthened, the system of academies and schools cannot meet these requirements. Coordinating classroom training with on-the-job training and giving light attention to neither are the constant guidelines for improving the quality of cadres.

We gained much valuable experience in providing advanced, on-the-job cadre training throughout the wars of resistance against France and the United States. In conjunction with attaching full importance to classroom elementary and advanced training, we must employ and develop upon our experience in providing on-the-job advanced training under the new conditions that exist and in the spirit of activism and initiative.

Over the past several years, the Political General Department has achieved success in holding high level on-the-job military training classes and has concluded these classes with good results. The on-the-job political classes of Military Region 7 and Military Region 9 were also successful. At present, high level on-the-job military classes of the agencies of the Ministry of National Defense and the High Command are being conducted. We must gain experience in every area from these classes and widely develop this experience in other units in the advanced training of regimental and division level cadres. The academies must promote the organizing of on-the-job training classes in order to help cadres who are unable to attend schools to study under a stipulated program.

As regards basic level cadres, the divisions and provincial military commands must hold short-term training classes based on a minimum program for platoon and company cadres and local military cadres who have attended school. If each class lasted from 3 to 6 months, each place could hold two or three classes each year for hundreds of basic level cadres within the division and province, classes at which they could complete the necessary program, thereby insuring that they can complete their tasks well and have the conditions needed to be selected for higher classes.

While taking positive steps to hold short-term advanced training classes, providing advanced training on an emergency basis, providing yearly training and so forth, we must attach full importance to pairing cadres in the realities of combat and work. The upper level must train the lower level, the commander must train the assistant commanders in a planned and effective manner. This is a very good way to coordinate theory with practice and effectively raise the qualifications of and forge and challenge cadres.

It is necessary to develop upon the role played by the academies, schools and the organizational work of agencies, develop the desire to learn and the desire to make progress of cadres and rapidly put on-the-job training on a regular and effective basis.

3. The matter of the number of cadres.

In view of the special characteristics of our present situation, there are many areas that are having a major influence upon the number of cadres and the effort to meet quantitative requirements regarding the cadres of our army, such as the change in the leadership and command organizational mechanism; the fact that the majority of middle level and high level cadres have experienced several wars of resistance, are old and are in poor health; the requirements of the task of maintaining combat readiness, which demand a certain percentage of standing cadres; our limited ability to accept cadres for training due to the failure of the development of the army's school system to keep pace with requirements; the many difficulties still involved in cadre rear service support and so forth.

Providing the proper number of cadres in order to insure that the army's corps of cadres is of suitable size and high quality is a matter of very important significance. Whether this effort is performed correctly or incorrectly, whether it is performed well or not will have a direct impact upon the stratum of persons leaving the army as well as the stratum of persons remaining within the army and continuing to perform their tasks.

For this very reason, the effort to provide the proper number of cadres must involve close coordination among ideological work, organizational work and policies and must reflect firm adherence to the party's viewpoint that "we must rely entirely upon the task, work and the requirements of the organization" in the deployment and assignment of cadres.

Ideological work cannot replace organizational work and policies; conversely, policies, although they are very important, cannot decide everything. In the field of policy, there are many problems that must be resolved; however, it is also clear that the realities of the situation do not permit us to resolve each and every problem immediately. Consequently, in order to provide the proper number of cadres in exact accordance with the viewpoint of the party and in a manner consistent with the requirements of the buildup and combat of the army, we must attach importance to and know how to closely coordinate ideological work, organizational work and policies, without giving light attention to any area.

Because "we must rely upon the task, work and the requirements of the organization," the effort to provide the proper number of cadres must insure the balance and coordination of the corps of cadres of the regular force, modern people's army, of the people's armed forces in the cause of building and defending the fatherland. This balance and coordination must not only exist within each sector and unit, but must also be expressed in many fields, must also exist among the various services and branches, between standing forces and reserve forces, between war time and peace time, between the immediate future and the long range.

To insure this balance, the transfer of cadres to and from the various levels, services, branches and agencies must also be very well balanced. Very positive steps must be taken on the basis of precise calculations, scientific projections and a common, unified plan, with specific planning and plans adopted from the very outset. Facts have shown that the practices of doing as one's sees fit, operating in a piecemeal fashion and not strictly complying with plans are one of the causes of the lack of balance within the corps of cadres.

In our present situation, there is the phenomenon of many joining the corps but few leaving, of it being easy to join but difficult to transfer someone from the corps. We must rapidly put transfers to and from the corps of cadres on a regular basis; in the immediate future, we must comply with the regulations of the Minister of National Defense.

As regards cadres who are transferred from the corps, we must care for them in a wholehearted and thorough manner, must reflect the concern of the party and the army for them so that they are content and so that the persons remaining behind have piece of mind and display a high spirit of responsibility in building the armed forces.

As regards retired cadres, we must implement systems and policies in exact accordance with regulations. Importance must be attached to political mobilization; at the same time, we must make the greatest possible effort permitted by circumstances to supply them with daily essentials in accordance with established standards. Importance must be attached to promoting and reducing the difficulties encountered by cadres before they retire.

As regards able-bodied cadres who still have time to serve in the army, we must rapidly classify and assign them and send them for supplementary education and

advanced cultural training on a rotation basis so that they are fully capable of strengthening strategically importance places and in order to insure that command cadres have experience and create the conditions for unit cadres to go on leave, attend training, rest and improve their health.

4. Building the corps of reserve officers.

The corps of reserve officers is the nucleus of the reserve force. Building the corps of reserve officers is one of the important elements in the military line of the party in the new stage. This is a strategic issue in building and defending the fatherland and is a pressing demand of the task of building the people's armed forces as well as building the economy.

Building the force of reserve officers is one of the major requirements in implementing the Officers Service Law and the long-term planning of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee regarding cadres.

Only with a strong corps of reserve officers can we gradually resolve the imbalance between standing forces and reserve forces, gradually reduce the size of the standing corps of officers and create the conditions for focusing our efforts upon and improving the quality of the standing corps of officers, thereby insuring the mobilization of the tremendous capabilities of the various sectors of the state to meet national defense needs in both peace time and war time.

The building of the corps of **reserve** officers must be directed toward the following objectives: making every effort to train, build and manage the corps of reserve officers in accordance with the requirements of a regular force, modern people's army and establishing regulations and an organizational system of cadres specializing in reserve officer work in order to put this work on a regular basis.

Between now and 1985, we must endeavor to successfully build a corps of reserve officers of suitable quality and efficient size, a corps that has an increasingly complete structure encompassing all the various services, branches, levels and necessary specialized sectors so that it can be readily organized into complete mobilized reserve units that promptly meet the requirements of war situations.

In the years ahead, the sources of reserve officers are discharged non-commissioned officers trained to be officers and students of the various colleges whose occupations are suited to the requirements of national defense. Now that the Officers Service Law has been implemented and put on a regular basis, importance must be attached to the registration and management of officers in the standing forces who are transferred to the reserves and special importance must be attached to the reserve officers of the various services, branches and professional sectors because this force is still imbalanced at this time.

With a firm grasp of the requirements and objectives involved in building the corps of reserve officers, we must focus on performing the following jobs well:

To begin with, the commanders of the various levels and sectors must have a full and correct understanding of the role and position of the corps of reserve officers and turn this understanding into determination to provide the proper guidance in order to successfully meet the norms assigned to them.

Although importance must be attached to numbers, special importance must be attached to quality to insure the effectiveness of the buildup of the corps of reserve officers. We must guide registration and management in a very close and detailed manner, register and manage all officers who are trained and immediately assign these officers to reserve units while adopting yearly supplementary training plans so that the qualifications of reserve officers always meet the requirements of tasks. The military regions and the local military commands have a major responsibility in this work and must truly delve into organizing implementation. The various military regions, military corps, services and branches must fully concern themselves with training those non-commissioned officers who have completed their military service to be reserve officers.

It is necessary to strengthen and improve the quality of the organizations and cadres specializing in reserve officer work on the various levels, with importance attached to the provincial level, the district level and similar levels; at the same time, we must improve the quality of the reserve officer training groups at the colleges, sectors and so forth.

We must strictly comply with the provisions concerning reserve officers within the Vietnam People's Army Officers Service Law and the other regulations promulgated by the state.

5. Improving the methods for selecting and managing cadres and putting cadre work under regulations.

This is an important requirement in building the corps of cadres and in cadre work that was set forth in the resolution of the 5th Party Congress.

The improvement of the selection of cadres and the management of cadres must comply with the viewpoints and principles set forth by the party. The selection of cadres (which includes their promotion, appointment, deployment and assignment) must be entirely based on the requirements of tasks, of work.

In the appraisal and evaluation of cadres, we must be objective, unbiased and faithful and must reflect the viewpoints and sentiments of the party concerning cadres. The examination of cadres must be comprehensive. We must evaluate and appraise cadres on the basis of political standards and standards regarding cadre special skills and capabilities set forth by the 5th Congress of the Party and not do so on the basis of prejudices toward cadres regarding past shortcomings. The cadres working in every sector must know how to manage and command their sector and we must give full attention to standards but must use the results of combat and work as the final measurement of standards.

The standards for selecting cadres must be based on the requirements regarding standards adopted by the 5th Congress of the Party and set forth in the various resolutions of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee regarding cadre work as well as in the Officers Service Law. What must be emphasized and is a new spirit in the resolution of the 5th Party Congress is that we must attach full importance to boldly training dependable and competent management cadres to be ready to take the place of other cadres. The various levels and commanders must perform this work with a high spirit of responsibility and revolutionary sentiment. On the other hand, we must utilize the existing corps of cadres well, especially those cadres who have been challenged and forged, who have much experience in combat and work, the military instructors and scientific researchers at the agencies of the Ministry of National Defense, the academies and the schools and the cadres at the heads of the various sectors in the different fields as well as ethnic minority cadres. We must concern ourselves with cultivating their qualities and skills and creating favorable conditions for them to contribute their talents to the combat and buildup of the armed forces in a practical and long-range manner. While attaching importance to building the corps of management cadres, we must also give full attention to building the corps of basic level cadres. The 5th Congress of the Party pointed out: "Being concerned with building the corps of basic level cadres is a major policy of the party."(8)

In order to clearly understand each cadre and correctly utilize cadres, the commander and the cadre management agency must not only adopt the correct viewpoint, but must also employ correct methods. They must personally gain an understanding of persons and work. They must focus their efforts on inspecting the performance of work by each cadre. Only in this way can we help the party committee echelon correctly select and deploy cadres.

Cadre management is defined by an organizational system, management regulations and rules and scientific management methods. As the corps of cadres develops and becomes more diverse, cadre management must be put under tight regulations and performed in accordance with regulations. This is a basic measure for putting cadre work on a regular basis and avoiding manifestations of doing as one sees fit in the performance of the various aspects of cadre work.

In the years ahead, we must concentrate on formulating and perfecting the regulations governing cadre work, promulgating job titles and standardizing duties.

In order to help the party committee echelon and the commander manage cadres, we must strengthen the cadre management agencies on the various levels so that they are suited to the requirements of cadre management by sector, by service and branch; the managing of cadres by level, which was practiced in the past, must be abandoned. We must carry out the improvement of cadre agencies by specialized sectors: the combined branches, the services, the other branches, the specialized technical sectors, the rear service sector, the political sector and so forth and must improve the quality of cadre agencies on the basis of the characteristics, nature and task of each sector, each service, each branch and each unit and on the basis of the table of organization and the number of cadres that must be managed.

We must be fully concerned with cultivating and improving the political qualities of the corps of persons performing cadre work, improve their organizational, managerial and cadre work skills and deepen their knowledge in every area.

6. Implementing the Vietnam People's Army Officers Service Law is a basic aspect of cadre work in the new stage.

To continue to accelerate the building of our army into a regular force, modern people's army, we must first build the corps of officers.

The new Officers Service Law adopted by the 7th Legislature of the National Assembly in its second session represents a summary of the building of the corps of cadres of the Vietnam People's Army over a period of nearly 40 years and represents the application of the experiences gained in building the corps of officers of the fraternal socialist countries, especially of the Soviet armed forces, to the specific circumstances of our country, our army.

The promulgation of the Officers Service Law satisfies the objective requirements of the building of the corps of officers in the new stage and, at the same time, marks a new stage in the development of the building of a regular force, modern people's army, consequently, it has been an inspiration to all of our cadres and soldiers.

The viewpoint, tasks and policies of the party and state regarding building the corps of army cadres have been codified.

Implementing the Officers Service Law is a basic element of cadre work in the new stage. As a result, studying this law in order to gain a thorough understanding of and organize the implementation of the Officers Service Law and the Regulation on Implementing the Law that was promulgated must be carried out in a thorough and full manner.

Implementing the Officers Service Law will have a very positive impact upon the building of the corps of cadres but will also involve many difficulties and complications. For this reason, the commanders and the party organization must fully concern themselves with the implementation of the law, must personally and closely guide implementation and must avoid leaving this work up to the agency.

Above everything else, it is necessary to give each officer a correct and full understanding of the Officers Service Law and the Regulation on Implementing the Law. The Officers Service Law is the embodiment of the basic viewpoints and the positions and policies of our party and state regarding cadres; it is the embodiment of the profound concern of the party and state for building the army, building the corps of military officers. The highest objective of the Officers Service Law is to build a corps of army cadres that is suited to the new growth of our army, of our armed forces, in order to meet the new, very high requirements involved in building and defending the fatherland.

All chapters and articles of the law are closely linked to one another and supplement one another within a complete and comprehensive entity. Therefore, we cannot give attention to one chapter but not to another, cannot separate one chapter from another nor can one article be used to refute another.

The teaching of the law must be specific; however, we must insure that cadres take the viewpoint of the whole, have a firm grasp of the basic viewpoints of the party and the state and, on this basis, create a high level of unanimity of understanding, thinking and viewpoints within the corps of cadres, thereby generating confidence, enthusiasm and determination to struggle to improve one's qualifications in every area and fulfill one's tasks and duties. Ideological work must delve deeply into each category of cadres and promptly discover and correct incomplete understandings and incorrect viewpoints that lead to subjectivism and impetuosity or to conservatism and skepticism in organizing the implementation of the law. It is necessary to thoroughly overcome the tendency among some cadres to only be aware of rights while giving light attention to obligations, to only see the responsibility of the organization but not the responsibility of the individual, to only be aware of immediate interests but not long-range interests and so forth.

Organizing the implementation of the law is the responsibility of all levels and sectors, of commanders and of each officer depending upon his position and duty. There must be strict compliance with the law and the law must be used as the foundation, as the principle; however, it is also necessary to maintain a revolutionary and scientific point of view, a practical and developing point of view and apply the law in a manner consistent with the actual situation of the corps of cadres of the army, the situation of the country, of each service, branch, level, sector, unit, locality, battlefield and type of cadre in order to avoid being dogmatic, mechanical or divorced from reality.

The organization of the implementation of the Officers Service Law requires a period of transition in order to be achieved and cannot be done hastily. However, this is not a reason to fail to scrupulously comply with the law and the regulation on implementing the law. It must be clearly realized that fully complying with the law and the regulation on implementing the law is a practical way to lay a firm basis for fully implementing the Officers Service Law.

Promotions ahead of schedule, lengthening the time of service, resolving the problem of the number of cadres, raising the qualifications of cadres in accordance with their work duties or transferring cadres from the corps, all of these things must be done in accordance with the law and the regulation on implementing the law, must be closely and carefully guided under a specific plan and must be gradually carried out in exact accordance with the guidelines of the upper level. The tendencies to take a narrow point of view or a sweeping point of view in promotions, in assignments to and transfers from the corps and so forth are not in keeping with the spirit of the law and do not encourage cadres to struggle to complete their task and fulfill their duties well.

The Officers Service Law is the systematic embodiment of the viewpoints and policies of our party and state regarding the corps of cadres of the party and

state within the people's armed forces. Therefore, when examining matters regarding the policy concerning officers, we must do so in a comprehensive manner encompassing all areas: selection, elementary training, advanced training, deployment, utilization, unity, maintaining and caring for the spiritual and material lives of cadres and so forth. Policy matters cannot be restricted to the scope of a few specific regulations regarding remuneration.

The viewpoints of the party concerning the policy regarding army officers have always been consistent. However, the embodiment of these viewpoints must always be suited to the actual situation of the country. At present, difficulties in economic life and everyday life are having a rather strong impact upon every aspect of the country's situation. As a result, the remuneration of officers cannot be higher than that permitted by the common difficulties we face. We criticize the attitude of using difficulties as an excuse to lessen our responsibility when discussing matters regarding the policy concerning officers; at the same time, we also criticize the subjective, impetuous attitude of wanting to resolve policy matters in a manner divorced from the reality of the situation.

The Regulation on Implementing the Officers Service Law attaches importance to resolving many policy matters that are under the authority of the Ministry of National Defense. A number of other matters, such as salaries, assistance to the families of officers, the regulations regarding officers on special details, the regulations regarding professional officers and reserve officers and so forth, are also being urgently studied.

Many matters, although they represent legitimate aspirations, cannot be resolved until the necessary conditions have gradually been created.

In every situation, the resolution of matters regarding the policy pertaining to army officers must create positive factors, motivate the corps of cadres to complete each task of the army well and encourage every cadre, primarily the cadres who are performing arduous and difficult tasks at the places in the vanguard of the effort to defend the fatherland.

Resolving policy matters regarding officers is not only an issue of the army, but of the state, the various sectors, the localities and all of society as well. Consequently, cadre policy work must involve intensified research and must employ the tremendous capabilities, the support and the assistance of the various sectors and mass organizations in order to make numerous satisfactory proposals to the upper level, to the state and insure that the policy regarding officers always develops in a manner that keeps pace with the development of the army and in a manner consistent with the general cadre policy situation of the entire country.

The above are several basic matters regarding the cadre work of the party in the new stage that were defined by the 5th Congress of the Party and the application of these fundamental matters of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee in the building of the army's corps of officers.

They are the most essential matters, are the ones that control our thinking and actions, that determine the success of the effort to build the corps of cadres of our armed forces.

The party committee echelons and commanders must have a grasp of the cadre issue and must personally guide cadre work. The abilities of the leadership cadre and the command cadre in the new stage of the revolution also include the ability to manage cadre work, the ability to unite and rally cadres and the ability to dare to make decisions and take action in order to bring new quality to the corps of cadres and to the cadre work within the unit.

We can only perform these jobs on the basis of deeply and correctly understanding the viewpoints and positions of the party concerning cadre work, understanding and personally resolving problems, knowing how to coordinate and employ integrated ideological, organizational and policy measures and knowing how to provide comprehensive guidance while focusing appropriate efforts on guiding key matters related to cadre work within the unit and stimulating the successful completion of the political task of the unit and the fulfillment of the task and duties of each officer.

At present, many things must be done to improve the quality of cadres and the quality of cadre work. However, the matter that has a major impact upon each cadre, which is also a basic and extremely complex matter, is that of implementing the Vietnam People's Army Officers Service Law.

The party committee echelons and commanders on the various levels must have a firm grasp of the viewpoint of the party concerning cadre work that was set forth at the 5th Congress, have a firm grasp of the positions of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee concerning cadre work and personally guide the organization of the implementation of the Officers Service Law so that it yields the results desired by the party, by the mass of cadres, thereby making positive contributions to building the corps of cadres of the people's armed forces in the new stage of the revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. X.Y.Z.: "Sua doi loi lam viec" [Revising Work Methods], Su That Publishing House, 1959, p 52.
2. Ibid., p 57.
3. The Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the 5th National Congress of Delegates.
4. Ibid.
5. The Report on Party Building at the 5th National Congress of Delegates.

6. Ibid.
7. Le Duan: "Cach mang xa hoi chu nghia o Viet Nam" [The Socialist Revolution in Vietnam], Volume II, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 493.
8. The Report on Party Building of the Party Central Committee at the 5th National Congress of Delegates.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PHAM BAI ON MILITARY READINESS OF THAI BINH PROVINCE

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 82 pp 56-64

[Article by Pham Bai, member of the Party Central Committee and secretary of the Thai Binh Provincial Party Committee: "Thai Binh and the Tasks of Building the National Defense System, Maintaining Security and Maintaining Combat Readiness"]

[Text] Since the victory in the spring of 1975 and especially since 1979, Thai Binh Province, under the light of the resolutions of the 4th Congress of the Party and the resolution of the 4th Party Plenum and with the guidance of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and the party committee of Military Region 3 together with the other localities, has intensified the building of the national defense system, the maintenance of political security and social order and safety, the maintenance of combat readiness and preparations for a people's war to defend the locality, defend the fatherland. Through practice, the army and people of Thai Binh have begun to gain some experience in the following areas of work: building the defense battle position, building and strengthening the local armed forces, inducting youths, reinforcing battlefields, coordinating the economy with the defense of the nation, implementing the army's rear area policies, maintaining security and social order and safety...

1. Thoroughly Understanding the Political and Military Lines and Tasks in the Period of Building and Defending the Fatherland, Clearly Understanding the Position, Requirements and Tasks of the Province Regarding the Economy and National Defense System and Organizing the Performance of Military Tasks with the Best Possible Results

As soon as the task of building and strengthening the national defense system and preparing for a people's war to defend the fatherland was established, we asserted that this was a brand new, major strategic tasks concerning which our experience was still rudimentary and simple. At the same time, the situation of the country and the locality demanded that we immediately, urgently and actively carry out the various military tasks.

In the face of this actual situation, the Thai Binh party organization determined that it was necessary to simultaneously gain a thorough understanding of the viewpoints and line of the party and organize the successful performance of the national defense and security tasks of the locality.

The Thai Binh party organization attached importance to teaching the basic viewpoints of the party concerning socialist construction and defending the socialist fatherland; the line on the national defense system of all the people and the people's war; the relationship between building and developing the economy and building and strengthening the national defense system; the obstinant, clever and dangerous scheme of aggression of the enemy and the activities of their multi-faceted war of sabotage against our country. This educational effort was actively carried out on all levels and within all sectors in the province, the districts, the cities and installations as well as among all the people. Since 1979, the province has held nearly 200 training classes for the cadres of the various sectors and levels. Education and training have always been directed toward practical objectives regarding awareness, thinking and guidelines and measures for performing specific tasks involved in building the national defense system and coordinating the economy with the national defense system. The Thai Binh party organization gradually showed the people and the local armed forces the very important position occupied by the province in the economy and the national defense system in the face of the schemes and acts of the enemy in their war of sabotage as well as in the face of large-scale enemy attacks should a war break out. It occupies this very important position because Thai Binh is a province that lies along the seacoast less than 1 day's travel from Hai Nam Island. Thai Binh is also a densely populated, wealthy province lying in the southeast of the Red River Delta, a province that has many important water routes and highways. It can be said that Thai Binh is a frontline province (seen from the point of view of the ocean border) and a rear area province (seen from the point of view of the northern mainland border).

On the basis of the common situation and tasks of the entire country and the tasks of the locality, the provincial party committee adopted a resolution on local military activities in the new period and issued many specific resolutions regarding military tasks that were consistent with the conditions of the locality. The resolution of the provincial party organization congress held in April, 1977, pointed out that "coordinating the economy with the national defense system is a very basic aspect of local military work, is an important measure in carrying out the task of developing the economy and strengthening the national defense system within the locality." On the basis of the resolutions of the provincial party committee concerning military activities, the people's committees on the various levels took charge of mobilizing and organizing the performance of such specific tasks as building the local armed forces and building the battle position; conducting maneuvers and mobilizing forces in the rear to reinforce the front; strengthening the organizations leading, guiding and commanding the performance of national defense, security and combat readiness tasks and so forth. Facts have shown that in the process of performing military tasks, many problems regarding thinking, awareness and methods are raised that must be resolved. For example, when carrying out the construction of the combat readiness line,

there were some persons who maintained that this would be difficult to achieve or who were afraid that it would expend much manpower, materiel, money and so forth and adversely affect the development of production and economic construction. Such shortcomings and deviations were promptly corrected. Among these shortcomings and deviations, complacency and the feeling of being satisfied with old combat achievements and simple combat experiences regarding the task of coordinating the economy with the national defense system and the local military task, a lack of vigilance and swift response in the face of the schemes and acts of sabotage of the enemy and so forth were promptly criticized and resolutely overcome. The local party organization reminded the people and cadres that the achievements that had been recorded were not truly commensurate with the favorable capabilities of the province. Moreover, shortcomings in the buildup of forces, the building of the defense line and combat readiness were evident.

Over the past several years, Thai Binh has recorded its greatest achievements on the two fronts of production and strengthening the national defense system within the locality. The province's average rice yield has been 61.13 quintals per hectare. The amount of area under the cultivation of industrial crops has increased from 2,921 to 4,531 hectares. The total output of local industry has increased from 79 million to 92 million and 124.2 million dong. The main roads within the province, such as Route 10, Route 39, Route 206 and Route 39b and the interdistrict and intervillage roads have been upgraded. The above mentioned achievements in production have been of very important significance in the effort to strengthen the national defense system and increase the combat readiness of the army and people within the province. On the basis of accelerating production, Thai Binh has successfully initiated the work of building the combat readiness line, developing the mobile, combat militia and self-defense forces, performing army rear area work, mobilizing youths to join the army and so forth.

The Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the 5th Congress of the Party pointed out: "In the new stage of the revolution, all our people and our entire army, under the leadership of the party, must unite as one and make every effort to perform the two strategic tasks: first, successfully building socialism; secondly, maintaining combat readiness and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland." The Thai Binh party organization is making every effort to continue to give all cadres and party members, the local armed forces, all the people and the various levels and sectors within the locality a more thorough understanding of the two strategic tasks established by the party, create a high degree of unanimity in thought and actions and building an intense revolutionary spirit of the masses with regard to successfully performing both strategic tasks.

Correctly and Promptly Determining the Defense Plan and Guidelines of the Locality and Implementing the Plan and Guidelines in an Effective, Positive and Urgent Manner that Yields Actual Results

At present, our entire country is in a situation in which it is at peace but must constantly deal with the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the Beijing expansionists,

who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists; at the same time, we must still be ready to deal with a large-scale war of aggression launched by the enemy. This situation is very clearly seen in Thai Binh, a province that lies on the same sea that the enemy does. In view of this, we have taken the initiative in establishing and gradually implementing a plan and guidelines for strengthening the national defense system, the security and the combat readiness of the locality. This plan includes: defense guidelines of the province, districts, local troop units and combat village groups; a plan for building and strengthening the local armed forces; a plan and guidelines for managing and mobilizing manpower and materiel to support the requirements of the combat readiness and combat of the locality, of the entire country in different war situations; a plan on the stages of development of defense activities, the maintenance of order and security and so forth.

Once defense guidelines have been adopted, suitable steps must be taken so that we can take the initiative in implementing the established guidelines and plan. A basic factor in achieving this is closely linking the economy to the national defense system, the national defense system to the economy and closely coordinating immediate, pressing tasks with long-range tasks. Thai Binh has taken positive and urgent steps to gradually implement the plan for building the various defense lines throughout the province. Of these lines, the lines in the important areas and at important projects have been constructed on an urgent basis, such as the coastal defense line, the self-defense forces at the mouths of rivers, in the waters close to the seacoast and so forth in a manner closely linked to the task of developing production in these areas.

Facts have shown that coordinating the economy with the national defense system and vice versa is a very basic, comprehensive and long process that must be planned and codified. The buildup of forces and the building of defense lines have been closely coordinated with economic development and the reorganization of production and the redeployment of labor have been coordinated with the building of battle positions, the organizing of combat and combat readiness forces and the strengthening of the forces maintaining security and order. The building of the district into an industrial-agricultural economic unit, with the province being developed into the strategic unit of the national defense system and the building of the districts into agro-industrial structures with the district being developed into a military fortress have been gradually carried out through coordinating the efforts to meet the immediate and the long-range requirements of building the local economy and building the national defense system of all the people. We have coordinated the restoration and development of agricultural trades and the development of the economic production sectors at sea with the buildup and development of the self-defense forces at sea and in the mouths of rivers, the strengthening of the coastal defense lines and the maintenance of border security. The construction of dikes to reclaim land from the sea, the modification of the terrain and the opening of new population centers are one of the locality's important guidelines for the development of production that has been gradually implemented along with the construction of defense combat bases in the mouths of rivers and in strategically important areas. For example, in the villages of

Thai Thuong in Thai Thuy District and Dong Long, Dong Minh and Dong Hoang in Tien Hai District, the combat alert units of the villages have been organized into production units. The coastal districts of the province have organized many militia units that perform both production and combat readiness tasks along the seacoast and in the mouths of rivers. When building the defense project system, we planted more than 300,000 bamboo plants to serve as obstacles. Some of this bamboo can now be harvested to construct fortifications or be used as a raw material in the locality's export handicrafts sector.

When we organized the management of agricultural production to suit the product contracts being implemented within the locality, we attached importance to researching and proposing necessary regulations so that this step did not cause upheavals or difficulties but, instead, had the effect of strengthening the combat readiness organizations on the coastal line. The combat alert militia and self-defense units were organized as basic production units that also maintain a strict, regular combat alert system. The mobile combat militia units and the units specializing in security work have been organized in a manner in which they are closely coordinated with the specialized sector production units.

In order to insure the good implementation of the army's rear area policies under the conditions of production management based on product contracts, the provincial party committee sent groups of cadres from the province and groups of military cadres to installations to study the situation firsthand. On this basis, necessary regulations were adopted with a view toward developing upon positive factors and limiting and overcoming negative factors arising in the implementation of the army's rear area policies of the party and state. We consider this to be a new, complex matter, one that requires very much caution when resolving the problems raised by it. Every effort has been made to avoid resolving these problems in a simple, haphazard manner in order to not harm the effort to mobilize combat forces to defend the fatherland.

In a war to defend the fatherland, the building of defense projects to support combat operations is of very important significance. The system of permanent, strong defense projects and field projects requires the investment of much labor and materiel. This system of projects must be deployed in accordance with the defense strategy, plan and guidelines and must be operated in accordance with a unified plan with main points and in a manner consistent with the other areas of work. Our locality decided that building the system of defense projects is the task of all the people, of all sectors. Therefore, we mobilized and organized the forces of the entire province to concentrate on building key projects along the forward defense line. These projects have gradually been constructed in their order of priority.

While implementing the local defense plan and guidelines of the province, we have attached importance to initiating the effort to build the districts into military fortresses in accordance with a unified plan that coordinates the economy with the national defense system and coordinates the building of the national defense system throughout the province with the building of district military fortresses.

The building of district military fortresses has been carried out in a comprehensive economic, political and military manner. However, there have been specific objectives for each stage in the building of districts in order to insure that the districts have the forces and the battle position needed to complete immediate and long-range defense tasks. To date, all of the districts within the province have organized combat village groups and mobile, combat militia and self-defense units. Many districts have held maneuvers in fighting methods, in the combat command of groups and districts and so forth. Combat groups that build their forces well and maintain combat readiness well have emerged, such as Dong Minh in Tien Hai District, the Do Intersection group in Dong Hung District and so forth.

Strengthening political security and improving social order and safety are always considered one of the basic elements in the process of strengthening the national defense system, maintaining combat readiness and engaging in combat in the various localities of the province. As a result of the multi-faceted schemes and acts of sabotage of the Beijing expansionists, the security and social order situation within the province has undergone developments that are more complex. The provincial party committee and the provincial people's committee have led and guided an effort to unify and centralize the national defense and security forces within the province, improve the methods of guidance and the methods of organizational work and improve the utilization of forces with a view toward creating a combined strength for use in the maintenance of political security and social order. Experience has shown that we must resolve this problem on the hamlet, village, town and street level and must, above everything else, receive determined leadership and guidance from the party and government and have the active participation of the masses. In the recent past, some villages, such as Thai Thuong Village in Thai Thuy District, have developed good movements of all the people performing security work. In these villages, social order has been maintained at a rather high level. The people of these villages have stopped acts of theft. They no longer need to worry about their belongings being stolen while they sleep at night. The Thai Binh party organization is trying to develop upon this initial victory in security work. In the immediate future, we must perform good security work at installations and in key, strategically important areas. We must steadfastly mobilize the people and the mass of cadres and soldiers within the armed forces as well as cadre, manual workers and civil servants to actively participate in the struggle against the spy war, the psychological war and the acts of sabotage of the enemy, against negative, dishonest phenomena and so forth.

Generally speaking, as a result of establishing a correct plan and guidelines for building the national defense and security systems, maintaining combat readiness and organizing the active, urgent implementation of the plan and guidelines that were established, Thai Binh is gradually building the strong battle position of mastery and attack of the local people's war, thereby making it possible for the province to take the initiative in performing both its production and combat readiness tasks well, promptly meeting the requirements of the immediate defense task and creating the conditions for building a modern, socialist national defense system of all the people over the long range.

3. Building Strong Local Armed Forces

Today, everyone is aware of the very important strategic role of the local armed forces within our system of organization of the military forces of the national defense system and the people's war to defend the fatherland. Therefore, the Thai Binh party organization has always concerned itself with leading the comprehensive buildup and strengthening of the armed forces in a manner consistent with the development of tasks, capabilities, organizational structure and modes of combat activities in the fight to defend the locality, in the war to defend the socialist fatherland. The task of the local armed forces is to fight the enemy on the frontline, to employ their new strength and coordinate closely in combat with the main force units. Every district and the entire province is a basic combat organization, is a strategic unit in the overall defense posture of the entire country that employs its full strength in campaigns against enemy troops landing from the sea or the air or enemy troops launching a large-scale aggression. Importance has been attached to building the local troops, the border security troops, the reserve forces and the militia and self-defense forces. As regards these forces, the local troops have been built to the point where they have the strength needed to serve as the key combat force in a people's war to defend the fatherland; at the same time, importance has been attached to consolidating and strengthening the militia and self-defense organization as the widespread combat force of the locality. The form of organization of the militia and self-defense forces is still based on the requirements of building the system of combat villages; at the same time, we have organized combat groups, key defense areas and mobile, combat militia and self-defense units of suitable size on the basis of combat requirements and tasks in the district as a whole and on the basis of local combat capabilities. As regards factories, enterprises, state farms, worksites, agencies and so forth, we have organized platoons, companies or large-scale units depending upon the characteristics and actual capabilities of each place. Thai Binh has relied upon the actual capabilities of the locality and of all the people in order to increase the size of the local armed forces to the necessary level; at the same time, it has always closely linked increases in the size of forces with improving the quality of the local armed forces to insure that they are politically dependable, well trained, well commanded and in a high state of combat readiness.

Thai Binh has attached particular importance to developing the role and impact of demobilized troops, discharged troops and troops transferred to another sector, considering them to be one of the factors in creating new capabilities, creating a new combat quality for the local armed forces. As regards the reserve forces, our locality has begun to attach importance to managing and building these forces in order to insure that reserve cadres and soldiers are always ready in terms of their morale, organization, training and so forth to rapidly supplement the army and reinforce the frontlines in combat when necessary. Clearly aware of the important strategic role of the reserve forces in a modern people's war to defend the fatherland, we are attaching importance to tightly managing this force and improving the policies and regulations regarding it along regular force, well coordinated lines with a view toward increasing the size of these forces, improving their quality and insuring that they can be rapidly mobilized in accordance with a mobilization order from the state, from the Ministry of National Defense.

In the years ahead, the Thai Binh party organization must concentrate on performing better those jobs that must be performed in order to improve the quality of the local armed forces, such as strengthening the units that are now performing tasks on the front, improving the sense of organization and discipline in the maintenance of combat readiness, performing inspections well and maintaining the weapons, equipment and materials used to support combat. The various levels of the government and the various sectors must concern themselves with and adopt effective measures for improving the spiritual and material lives and the eating facilities of the combat alert units and the regular troop units stationed within the locality, the units participating in security work and so forth.

The Military Service Law and the People's Army Officers Service Law that were recently promulgated by the National Assembly are of very important significance in strengthening the armed forces. The Thai Binh party organization has established the task of the various levels and sectors as concerning themselves with teaching youths about their military obligation, teaching youths to eagerly join the army and teaching them, if they possess the necessary capabilities and qualifications, to be ready to volunteer to study, to forge themselves to become outstanding officers of the regular force, modern people's army. The annual induction of youths in accordance with the law must be put on a regular basis and be conducted in a manner that reflects high quality. It is first of all necessary to improve registration work and the keeping of statistics, build the reserve forces, concern ourselves with providing work and jobs and knowing how to use those persons who are discharged from the army in economic, political and military tasks within the locality.

4. Developing the Combined Strength of the Entire Dictatorship of the Proletariat System and Closely Coordinating the Economy with the National Defense System

This is the viewpoint and line as well as the law in the buildup and defense of the socialist fatherland in our country at this time. In the strengthening of the national defense system and the maintenance of combat readiness, our combined strength consists of socialist production forces and socialist production relations, of the entire organizational system of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the economy, politics, culture and society. In order for the province to become a strategic unit of the national defense system and the people's war to defend the fatherland and the locality, all areas of activity and all sectors within the province as well as all levels within the locality must be mobilized and organized in order to closely coordinate the work of the sector with the work of strengthening the national defense system and maintaining combat readiness. We must mobilize this combined strength on our level and within the economic sectors and agencies of the province. Because, these are the places where there are many technical cadres and workers and the technical material means needed for the national defense system and the people's war. These are also the areas in which, if we are not fully concerned with them, it will be impossible to develop an important component of our combined strength when war breaks out and in which

upheavals will easily occur, thereby reducing our combat effectiveness from the very outset.

For this reason, the standing committee of the provincial party committee has established military activity tasks within the various sectors and strengthened the military organizations within the necessary sectors. The provincial people's committee has assigned a military activity task and a war time mobilization task to related sectors. Over the past several years, the public health sector, the posts-telegraph sector, the agricultural sector, the propaganda-training sector, the information-cultural sector and so forth have actively carried out the military tasks assigned to them. More than 500,000 mandays have been mobilized, nearly 200,000 cubic meters of field defense projects and thousands of cubic meters of permanent projects have been constructed, obstacles of bamboo and rattan have been constructed all along the seacoast of the province, etc. These achievements reflect the initial results of the process of closely coordinating the economy with the national defense system and developing the combined strength of the entire dictatorship of the proletariat system in the locality, which have been organized by the committees on the various levels.

They are also the results of being concerned with building a province that is strong politically and organizationally and strengthening the leadership of the party on every level. In the face of the new situation and tasks, the province has attached importance to building the organizations of the party, from the basic units to the district and provincial organizations. The main element involved in building the organizations of the party is improving their ability to lead and organize implementation and their fighting strength with a view toward insuring that party organizations and party members move forward to fulfill their task as the vanguard warriors fighting on the most decisive line and, at the same time, as the persons who lead and guide the performance of the tasks of building and defending the fatherland. In a manner closely linked to party building, the province has attached importance to strengthening the government, strengthening and perfecting the socialist production relations, building the sense of ownership of the masses and so forth in order to perform both strategic tasks well. The province has given very much attention to teaching and forging military cadres and the military agencies within the locality and improving their ability to lead and command so that they are able to perform their task in the buildup of the national defense system and the conduct of the people's war to defend the fatherland. The province has determinedly sent cadres to attend classes organized by the upper level and has, at the same time, organized training classes and maneuvers in order to educate and forge military cadres and agencies in commanding coordinated combat operations within their locality, building the sense of organization and discipline, forging and improving their style of command under the new combat conditions and so forth.

The new situation and task face the people of our entire country as well as each locality with the need to focus their efforts on and raise to a level of foremost importance the task of building the economy, concern themselves with living conditions and, at the same time, not be lax for one moment in the tasks

of strengthening the national defense and security systems and maintaining combat readiness. Consequently, in the leadership, guidance and organization of the performance of the tasks of building and defending the fatherland, Thai Binh has begun to create the conditions needed to establish a good relationship between these two tasks with a view toward successfully completing both of them. Our locality still faces difficulties in production and everyday life. The requirements involved in strengthening the national defense and security systems and maintaining combat readiness are very high. However, with the resolutions of the 5th Party Congress lighting our way and with our people's inherent tradition of patriotism and indomitability, Thai Binh, as well as the other localities of the entire country, will surely move forward, overcome every difficulty, successfully complete the task of developing the economy, improve the standard of living and perform the tasks of strengthening the national defense and security systems and maintaining combat readiness better. The people and the party organization of Thai Binh are determined to build a prosperous and strong province and, together with the rest of the country, defeat every scheme and act of sabotage and aggression of the Chinese expansionists, who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists, and firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

'VODK' REPORTS ON FULRO ACTIVITIES IN DAC LAC

BK260255 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea
2330 GMT 25 Jul 82

[Text] Here is a report on the combat activities of the Dega-Fulro guerrillas on the Dac Lac battlefield:

On 4 and 9 June, the Dega-Fulro guerrillas attacked the Vietnamese Le Duan troops conducting operations at (Yang Khlaeun) Hill, west of (Tving N'ropong), and in the spiked fields near (Ea Fachao) Stream, killing three soldiers, wounding three others and seizing an M-79 and five rounds.

On 15 and 28 June, the Dega-Fulro guerrillas attacked the Vietnamese Le Duan troops raiding (Satom M'ton), south of (Trapeang ROUNG), and attacked them at (Ampil Phnum) village, east of (Trapeang ROUNG), killing 7 enemy soldiers, wounding 7 others and seizing an AR-15 and 40 rounds, 4 handgrenades, 12 rucksacks and a radio receiver.

In sum, on the Dac Lac battlefield, the Dega-Fulro guerrillas killed or wounded 20 Vietnamese Le Duan soldiers and seized an M-79, an AR-15, 4 handgrenades, a radio receiver, 12 rucksacks and a quantity of ammunition.

CSO: 4212/28

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

'VODK' REPORTS ON FULRO ACTIVITIES IN BAN ME THOUT

BK270535 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian to Kampuchea
2330 GMT 26 Jul 82

[Text] Here is a report on the combat activities of the Dega-Fulro guerrillas on the Ban Me Thuot battlefield:

On 3 and 7 May, the Dega-Fulro guerrillas ambushed the Vietnamese Le Duan troops south of (Os Stea) position near route 21 and at a position east of (Te Din) station killing six soldiers and wounding two others. The Vietnamese suffered another dead and a number of wounded when they stepped on mines and punji stakes. An AK, 50 rounds of AK ammunition, 2 AR-15's, 50 rounds of AR-15 ammunition and 5 rucksacks were seized.

Between 15 and 19 May, the Dega-Fulro guerrillas attacked the Vietnamese Le Duan soldiers at (O Tav) Village, east of Ban Me Thuot, and west of (Buon Aokmang) position killing six and wounding nine others. The guerrillas seized an M-79 and 4 grenades, 3 AK's and 75 rounds, 3 AR-15's and 80 rounds and 13 rucksacks and destroyed 2 tractors, a truck, 9 barracks and a depot.

On 23 May, the Dega-Fulro guerrillas attacked and ambushed the Vietnamese Le Duan soldiers east of (Bich Mot) position, near (Suk Nam) Hill, killing eight and wounding five. One of those who stepped on the Dega-Fulro punji stakes near (B'nam Moton) was killed and three others wounded. Two AK's, 50 rounds, 2 AR-15's and 6 rucksacks were seized.

On 25 May, the Dega-Fulro guerrillas ambushed a Vietnamese truck at (O Ea) Bridge near (Buon Soc) village, on Route 21, killing three Vietnamese soldiers and wounding five others. They also seized 4 AK's, 225 rounds and 3 rucksacks.

In sum, the Dega-Fulro guerrillas in the Ban Me Thuot battlefield killed or wounded 49 Vietnamese Le Duan soldiers, destroyed 2 tractors, a truck, an ammunition depot and 9 barracks. They also seized an M-79, 4 grenades, 6 AK's and 350 rounds, 7 AR-15's, 130 rounds and 27 rucksacks.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NGHE TINH BUILDS PEOPLE'S SECURITY NETWORK

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Aug 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Nghe Tinh Builds People's Security Network, Carries Out Border Security Work Well"]

[Excerpt] Nearly all of the hamlets and villages in the mountain region of Nghe Tinh Province, including the high-altitude areas along the border, have created a network of people's security teams. The "For the security of the homeland" movement is being increasingly expanded and has encouraged the people of the ethnic minority groups to keep up their guard and help the armed security forces discover and stop enemy activities. The militia forces have been consolidated and account for 16 percent of the population. They train continually, in order to ensure good combat quality. The security forces and the armed forces must coordinate closely with the militia units and people's security teams in applying many professional measures and attaining high efficiency.

The party committee echelons and governmental administrations continually pay attention to the security work. In the key areas the district and village administrations have, along with the public security forces and the main-force troops, taken the initiative in tracking down hooligans, criminals, and political elements, correctly and promptly dealt with incidents, and confiscated for the state millions of dong and many valuable goods.

Many districts and villages in the mountain region of Nghe Tinh, such as Ky Son, Duong Duong, and Que Phong districts, and the villages of Na Ngoi (Ky Son), Mai Son (Tuong Duong), and Nghia Loi (Nghia Dan) have outstanding "For the security of the homeland" movements.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NAM DINH SOLVES MILITARY DESERTER PROBLEM

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Jul 82 p 3

[Local Military News column: "Nam Dinh City Resolves Problem of Military Personnel Who Have Not Yet Fulfilled Military Obligations"]

[Text] In order to do a good job of recruiting youths in 1982 the military draft committee of Nam Dinh City had effectively dealt with military personnel who have not yet fulfilled their missions in the army. A number of subwards, such as Tran Hung Dao, Truong Thi, Vi Xuyen, Tran Dang Ninh, Quang Trung, Cua Bac, Nang Tinh, Tran Te Xuong, and the village of My Tan, have done a good job of implementing that task. Due to prompt encouragement and education, 100 percent of the military personnel who have not yet fulfilled their military obligations have filled out requests to return to the army. More than 100 men in Category 1 have enthusiastically set out to accept missions.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMY NEWSPAPER CALLS FOR BETTER GUIDANCE OF MILITARY CONTROL UNITS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Jul 82 pp 1,4

[Editorial: "Guide the Military Control Forces in Acting in Correct Accordance With Their Function"]

[Text] In order to organize good management of military personnel and military transportation facilities in areas in which troops are stationed, maintain strict military discipline, correctly enforce state laws, and contribute to maintaining political security and social order and safety, the command echelons of the areas in which troops are stationed are authorized to send out military control teams to fulfill missions wherever necessary. During the recent period the military control forces have exerted their positive effect, helped the commanders in areas in which troops are stationed to fulfill their responsibility of maintaining strict military discipline, and promptly deal with all violations of discipline by military personnel in areas in which troops are stationed, in correct accordance with army orders and state laws. At the same time, they have contributed importantly to maintaining political security and social order and safety in the localities. A very large number of military control teams and units have fulfilled their missions well and have the confidence of the cadres, enlisted men, and people.

However, according to an investigation and to widespread public opinion, in some places some military control units have not done their work in correct accordance with the stipulated functions and missions. Some military control teams do not sincerely admonish and assist military personnel in maintaining discipline and observing laws. The exercising of control and uncovering, stopping, and dealing with violations of military discipline and state laws are not yet truly strict, prompt, and just. When disposing of incidents that occur there are instances of failure to correctly observe principles and procedures. The deportment and work style of some military personnel fulfilling military control missions are not exemplary and proper, and there are even times when they harass cadres and enlisted men when they are outside the camp.

The reason for that situation is that the command echelons in the areas where troops are stationed have not meticulously educated, or paid attention to inspecting and closely monitoring, the military control forces that are sent out. The selection and training of cadres and men to fulfill that mission are not yet truly suitable. Furthermore, some military control personnel do not yet consciously and

correctly fulfill their functions, and some even act contrary to regulations and their authority, and violate the dignity and property of the cadres and men.

In order to further strengthen the positive effect of the military control teams and rapidly rectify the deficiencies and overcome the negative aspects, the organs and cadres directly guiding the activities of the military control forces must organize profound education and meticulous supplementation for military personnel fulfilling military police missions, regarding the troop cantonment and sentry orders and the regulations regarding the disposition of incidents. Furthermore, it is necessary to continually inspect, and maintain professional practices on the part of, cadres engaged in military police work, before, during, and after their activities. At the same time, we must closely listen to the constructive opinions of the cadres, the men, and the people. Furthermore, when outside the camp the cadres and men must positively assist the military control forces by the exemplary, voluntary carrying out of army orders and state laws, demonstrating a civilized life style in public places and, when reminded, accepting criticism and promptly correcting their deficiencies. When they commit mistakes it is necessary to fully observe the regulations regarding the disposal of incidents by the military control teams.

Only thereby can the activities of the military control teams attain the goals and requirements that are set.

5616
CSO: 4209/476

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARMY NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL URGES COMMON MILITARY-CIVILIAN WILL

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Achieve a Common Military-Civilian Will"]

[Text] All cadres and enlisted men in our army are children of the people, are from the people, and fight for the people. It has always been true that wherever they are stationed our troops are always cared for, loved, and assisted by the people. All of those relationships are lively manifestations of the tradition of close solidarity between the people and our army.

Maintaining and developing that tradition and positively achieving a common military-civilian will is a permanent responsibility of the armed forces.

Each sphere of life of our people in the various parts of our country has an important position politically, socially, economically, defensively, etc., so helping the people build localities that are strong in all respects is a mission of foremost importance which manifests the spirit of a common military-civilian will in fulfilling the strategic missions of building socialism and defending the socialist homeland.

Many units which are stationed and active in the strategically important areas, such as Regiment M98, Brigade B4, the Mekong Corps, etc., have done a good job of achieving a common military-civilian will. While maintaining a high degree of combat readiness and working at an urgent pace, many units have still taken the initiative in helping the localities carry out a propaganda campaign for the masses to create a combative battlefield position, consolidate the agricultural cooperative relationship, build schools and day-care centers, treat illnesses, eliminate superstition, etc. Cadres and enlisted men positively carry out the policies and laws of the state, enter deeply into the various strata of people, carry out propaganda so the people oppose the enemy's reactionary psychological warfare, etc. With an exemplary work style of maintaining strict military discipline, and with an enthusiastic spirit of going all-out to help the people, our units have the love and confidence of the people and the solidarity between the troops and the people becomes increasingly closer. But there are also some units which do not yet pay adequate attention to that task and do not yet regard participation in the building of the localities in which they are stationed so that they become strong politically, militarily, economically, and culturally as an important mission. Indeed, they do not even manage the unit well, and some military personnel even violate

discipline in relations with the people. Such units are not yet able to contribute to building strong rear areas, an indispensable condition if our army is to do a good job of fulfilling all combat-readiness and combat missions.

In the present situation, it is even more important that the units, especially those stationed in the areas of strategic importance economically and defensively, such as the northern border area, the highly populated municipalities and cities, and the key industrial and agricultural areas, stress the good performance of the task of campaigning for the achievement of a common military-civilian will.

The mission that is posed for all units is continually educating the troops so that everyone can profoundly understand that mission and meticulously organize its fulfillment. All cadres and enlisted men stationed in a locality must be nuclei for generating revolutionary thought among the masses, enable the masses to fully understand and believe in the policies and lines of the Party, and strictly observe the laws of the state. Each unit is responsible for, along with the locality, strengthening the political-moral unity of the soldiers and people, contribute to helping the locality develop economically and culturally, maintain good security and order, and smash all cunning sabotage plots of the enemy.

Wherever they are our troops must maintain strict discipline in military-civilian relations. In combat as well as in construction our cadres and men must go all-out in protecting the lives and property of the people, respect their customs and habits, strictly observe state laws and local regulations, and absolutely refrain from doing anything to adversely influence the army's revolutionary tradition and military-civilian solidarity. When there are shortcomings or deficiencies they must sincerely criticize themselves and resolutely correct them.

Showing all-out concern for building and consolidating the relationship of a common military-civilian will is to not a manifestation of the revolutionary nature and revolutionary tradition of the army but is also an especially important mission to increase our army's fighting strength.

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CSO: 4209/476

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REGULATIONS REGARDING MILITARY TRAIN TRAVEL PUBLISHED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 28 Jul 82 p 3

[Results of Readers' Letters column: "Regulations Regarding Travel on Military Trains on the North-South Route"]

[Text] In order to answer the letters of a number of units, cadres, and enlisted men (relayed by QUAN DOI NHAN DAN) enquiring about travel on north-south military trains, the Troop Movement Section of the Transportation Department of the Rear Services General Department replied as follows:

North-south military trains enable cadres, enlisted men, and national defense workers to travel the entire distance of the north-south route. Comrades who are on leave or are going to a certain province and want to travel on such trains must register at the provincial station. Specifically:

- In Nghe Tinh, there is a station at Hung Dong Village, Hung Nguyen District.
- Thanh Hoa, station 80.
- Ha Nam Ninh, station 801.
- Thai Binh, station 802.
- Hai Phong, station 803.
- Hai Hung, station 804.
- Ha Son Binh, station 805.
- Ha Bac, station 181.
- Vinh Phu, station 82.
- Hanoi, station 99 on the Nam Bo route.

Comrades who register must bring along leave papers or travel papers certified by the governmental administration or organ where they are granted leave or given an assignment, accompanied by identity papers.

Station T2, on Van Chuong Street in Hanoi, is the registration point for comrades who are traveling alone and are members of units directly under the Ministry of National Defense which are stationed in the Hanoi area, and for comrades who live or are stationed in the south and who go to the northern provinces on business. They must have letters of introduction stamped with the unit seal (not a code-word seal), and the person signing the letter of introduction must be at the division (or equivalent) level or higher. They must also have travel orders and identity papers.

Comrades authorized to travel by train are issued a collective train ticket on which are listed the departure date, the person's name, the originating station, the destination station, the number of the car, and the number of the seat.

All military personnel and national defense workers are issued train tickets free of charge, and when they return to their unit they are not reimbursed for the price of the ticket. In the event that a ticket must be paid for, the E681 financial unit collects the fee and issues a receipt. Only then can the person travel by train and be reimbursed by the organ or unit. Otherwise, no unit can collect money for a ticket. Tickets which bear an incorrect date or name, or which have been purchased from other people, are invalid for travel by train.

If, while the train is en route, a cadre commanding a troop movement discovers an improper ticket he makes a report, confiscates the ticket, and requests the person to leave the train.

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CSO: 4209/476

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BRIEFS

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES--The public security force in Ba Dinh precinct of Hanoi has launched an all-people campaign against speculation, smuggling, and the production of fake goods. With the help of the people, within 1 month the force has arrested 100 cases involving these illegal activities, thus confiscating 3-million dong worth of gold, silver, antiques, precious stones, goods and raw materials. [BK310229 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 28 Aug 82]

HAI HUNG RECRUITING ACHIEVEMENT--As of 5 September, Hai Hung Province had completed calling up youths to join the armed forces for the second phase. All of its 12 districts and towns have delivered new recruits according to set norms and on schedule. Hai Hung is taking the lead in completing the 1982 second recruiting phase. This is the result of its satisfactory propaganda campaign to make youths understand the military service law. [BK071129 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 7 Sep 82]

CSO: 4209/486

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

ALBANIAN, ROMANIAN, DPRK NATIONAL DAY MESSAGES

OW092020 Hanoi VNA in English 1511 GMT 9 Sep 82

[Text] Hanoi, 9 Sep (VNA)--Vietnamese party and state leaders have received messages from leaders of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Socialist Republic of Romania greeting Vietnam's 37th National Day.

In their joint message, Enver Hoxha, first secretary of the Party of Labour of Albania Central Committee; Haxhi Lleshi, president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly; and Adil Carcani, chairman of the Council of Ministers, expressed their joy at the Vietnamese people's achievements in national reconstruction and development.

They wished the Vietnamese people further success in their efforts to build their country into a prosperous one. They also wished further consolidation and development of the friendship and cooperation between the two peoples.

On this occasion, Albanian Foreign Minister Reis Malile has sent a message of greetings to Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach.

In a message to Le Duan and Truong Chinh, Kim Il-song, secretary general of the Workers' Party of Korea, and president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, expressed his belief that the relation of friendship between the two countries will be developed. He wished the Vietnamese people many successes in the struggle to build socialism.

The message addressed by Yi Chong-ok, premier of the DPRK Administration Council, to Chairman Pham Van Dong wished the Vietnamese people success in the implementation of the Third Five-Year Plan.

On this occasion, Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ho Tam has extended greetings to his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Co Thach.

Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania Constantin Dascalescu, prime minister of the SRR; and Nicolae Giosan, chairman of the Grand National Assembly,

have sent a message to Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Huu Tho. They expressed their confidence in the further development of the co-operation and friendship between Romania and Vietnam on the basis of mutual respect, in the interests of the two peoples and the common cause of socialism, independence, peace and international cooperation.

They wished the Vietnamese people further achievements in the implementation of the resolutions of the 5th party congress, and in the all-round development of the country.

On this occasion, Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Andrei has sent greetings to Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach.

CSO: 4220/349

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

BRIEFS

TRAINING OF KAMPUCHEAN STUDENTS--The Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education recently met in Ho Chi Minh City to review the training of Kampuchean students in science and technology in Vietnam. Last year, despite numerous difficulties, various colleges and vocational middle schools were still able to satisfactorily train a contingent of scientific and technical cadres for Kampuchea. [BK310229 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 30 Aug 82]

DELEGATION TO KAMPUCHEA--Hanoi, 7 Sep (VNA)--A delegation of the VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY headed by General Director Dao Tung arrived in Phnom Penh on 6 September for a visit at the invitation of the Kampuchean News Agency SPK. The delegation was greeted at the airport by Em Sam An, general director of SPK; Penn Penha, editor-in-chief of the newspaper KAMPUCHEA; Sam Kim, deputy general director of the Voice of the Kampuchean People Radio; and others. Vietnamese Ambassador Ngo Din was also present. The delegation will discuss with its Kampuchean counterpart the expansion of cooperation between the two fraternal news agencies. [Text] [OW070739 Hanoi VNA in English 0702 GMT 7 Sep 82]

CSO: 4220/349

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

ROUND OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN HA BAC PROVES USEFUL

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 13 Aug 82 p 3

[Party Building column by Vu Giang: "Ha Bac Carries out Round of Political Activities"]

[Text] Right after the 5th Party Congress had been held, the Ha Bac Provincial VCP Committee was popularizing the basic spirit of its resolutions among the party bases, thus creating a confidence in the party organization. Carrying out a directive of the VCP Central Committee Secretariat, in the round of political activities this time, it affirmed the need to make all cadres and party members thoroughly understand the basic line and views in the resolutions. On the basis of their enhanced political concept, it reviewed the leadership of each party committee echelon and clearly determined the direction to take for implementing the resolutions in order to create obvious changes in the locality. The Standing Committee of the Provincial VCP Committee indicated the key points in the resolutions to be fully understood and at the same time provided guidance for self-criticisms and criticisms, first among the provincial party committee echelons. Making a comparison with the spirit of the party congress resolutions, the Provincial VCP Committee reviewed the party organization leadership in the recent period and made an in-depth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in the fulfillment of two strategic tasks, about economic leadership, building the industrial and agricultural structure, improving the economic and social management mechanism and caring about the people's life. A conference of the province's key cadres studied the resolutions and discussed the review of self-criticisms made by the provincial party committee. At the same time, the latter assumed direct leadership over opening a round of political activities in three installations -- the Ha Bac Machine Works, the Tan Trung (Tan Yen District) agricultural cooperative and the provincial banking organ -- to get some experience. The committee secretary and deputy secretary came in person to introduce the resolutions and to provide leadership and guidance as to how to conduct discussions and to combine the political activities with the final review of the campaign for issuing membership cards. To ensure good results for the round of political activities in all installations in the province, the Provincial VCP Committee carefully studied the review reports of district

VCP committees, combined the experiences acquired by three experimental locations for dissemination and held a conference to train reporters who would have to assume leadership and assist the installations in conducting political activities.

Serious Self-Criticisms and Criticisms

Vu Tho, secretary of the Ha Bac Provincial VCP Committee, emphasized: "The 5th Party Congress resolutions have given our province the bases for recognizing and evaluating the strengths and weaknesses we had in the past years, in the implementation of the resolutions of the 4th Party Congress."

Ha Bac is the province that lies at the northern gate of the capital and at the same time is the direct rear area of the northern border front. In this special location, to carry out simultaneously the two strategic tasks has an extremely important significance for Ha Bac. Its party committee has always been interested in assuming leadership over getting ready for combat to defend the fatherland, fighting the enemy's many-faceted war of destruction, properly fulfilling the military obligation, building the local military force and contributing to ensuring the living conditions of the main-force units stationed in the locality, as well as responding to their other needs.

The task of developing the economy and building socialism is closely linked with the national defense task. In the last 5 years, the local economy of Ha Bac was being developed in a relatively total manner and at a considerably good rate of increase. As compared with the previous 5 years, in the 5 years of 1976-1980 its gross social product increased by 36.9 percent; its income 40.8 percent; the value of its total agricultural production 3.8 percent; and the value of its total industrial production 5.1 percent. The task of stepping up agricultural production, with the key production being that of grain and foods, received proper recognition and importance in the form of two intensive-cultivation measures being taken -- raising crop yields and extending the cultivated areas by means of growing additional crops and opening new land. The outstanding mass movement of Ha Bac on the agricultural production front was the fact that it launched successive campaigns for water conservancy, soil improvement and fertilizer production. The volume of grain production in the last 5 years increased by 367,000 tons as compared with the previous 5 years (1971-1975). Of that grain production subsidiary food crops accounted for 27.6 percent in 1980 as compared with 11.7 percent in 1975. The total cultivated area increased by 242,000 hectares, with the area of rice crops increasing by 16 percent and the area of subsidiary food crops by 19.3 percent. Industrial and handicraft production showed good changes. Some major products like plows and harrows, improved vehicles, water pumps, lime, bricks, bowls, writing paper, tea, tobacco, etc. all showed increases. Animal husbandry showed changes in overall quality of hogs and weight of hogs going to market. Forestry, with the policy of doing total business and combining itself with agriculture, obtained good initial results. The local economy of Ha Bac still showed rather serious shortcomings and weaknesses, such as the redistribution of labor and

population in the province being carried out too slowly and the overall labor structure remaining unchanged. Land management was far from strict. Although the volume of export goods showed an increase, it was not proportional to the strength and potential of the locality's labor, land and traditional occupations. Ha Bac did not have any concentrated export crop-growing areas, nor any goods of stable production. Its export remained a passive and patchy undertaking of negligible value. A number of sectors had poor economic results, decreased labor productivity and many shortcomings in economic management. The economic measures were not yet closely combined with ideological education and administrative measures. The Ha Bac Provincial VCP Committee put special emphasis on the three following shortcomings of its party organization: it failed to fully grasp the locality's capabilities so as to use them as a basis to develop the masses' spirit of collective ownership and will power to promote self-sufficiency and self-strengthening for active and creative economic development and for overcoming difficulties and improving the standard of living; the efforts of all party committee echelons and sectors to organize and to assume leadership still showed a lack of determination, strict control and supervision and positive factors, with the good typical experiences being exploited rather slowly; and the fight against the negative phenomena, particularly in economic management, was still weak and rightist.

Ha Bac, which is a province having three economic zones in the delta, midlands and highlands, has not yet developed their strength nor created a mutual support among them. Its basic investigation generally was slow and failed to indicate clearly the bases for total and steady economic development. Planning has not yet become an effective tool for management of the local economy. The Provincial VCP Committee was very much interested in providing cadres and party members with advanced political training. Although most of them had gone through basic, primary and intermediate programs of training in political theories, the general degree of applying them to realities still showed many weaknesses. Some aspects of the revolutionary will power and concept of organization of discipline were somewhat decreased. A number of party members and cadres were deviant and retrograded. The expulsion of unqualified party members from the party was not firmly carried out in many installations. For instance, in the party organization of Tan Trung Cooperative, in the period of issuing membership cards, only two members were found to be unqualified and expelled from the party. In this round of political activities, which was combined with the final issuance of membership cards, the Tan Trung party organization was able to take the following action after it had reviewed in a more serious manner the qualifications of its members: 15 members considered unqualified and 8 others having clearly committed serious shortcomings were expelled from the party and 7 others were granted by the party chapter a period of probation in which they would have to strive to correct their shortcomings. To consolidate the primary party organizations, to wipe out the weak and poor party installations and to improve the quality of party members was also an important and urgent job of the Ha Bac party committee echelons.

Some New Prospects

The Ha Bac Provincial VCP Committee believed that to assume good leadership over this round of political activities in all primary party organizations would be an opportunity to consolidate the party, to raise the quality of party members and to make all cadres and party members fully understand the party views and line. To correctly evaluate the situation, to clearly see strengths and weaknesses and to carefully analyze the reasons would be the conditions for creating a strong basis for new determination and new revolutionary action. To develop the spirit of collective ownership, to rely first on one's own effort, to be active and creative in doing economic work and to step up production and business while maintaining profit-and-loss accounting on the basis of exploiting and fully using every potential capability and the existing material base of the locality -- all this is becoming the direction for the thinking and action of many party committee echelons, cadres and party members.

As it was adhering to the number-one task of the country as a whole, namely, producing grain and foods, Ha Bac clearly recognized its responsibility for the standard of living in the province and its obligation to the country in general. The direction to take on this front still was to continue practicing intensive cultivation and at the same time to extend the cultivated area by growing additional crops and opening new land. As the population of the province was increasing everyday, Ha Bac was determined to maintain the average per capita grain production level, which has reached the current figure of 326 kilograms, and to strive to raise it just a little bit more. The road that has been affirmed for us to take was to practice intensive cultivation in the present rice-cultivation area, to gradually expand the spring rice crop in the highlands and the tenth-month and winter rice crops in the midlands and delta so as to increase the rice-cultivation area by 1.2 percent by 1985. In the face of the country's need for grain and foods, Ha Bac was striving to further develop the winter rice and subsidiary food crops and to increase the annual average grain production by 6.5 percent, with subsidiary food crops accounting for 26 percent of it. To resolve the problem of clothing for its people, it was stepping up production of export agricultural products and consumer goods to exchange for cotton materials, extending the area for growing mulberries to feed silkworms, making plans for growing more "cay bo" to get fibers to make cotton materials or gunnysacks and making rugs for export to exchange for cotton materials. The need for 8 million meters of cotton materials per year for the population of the province in the current 5-year plan could be materialized. Ha Bac has a paper-manufacturing enterprise in Tan Yen of a capacity of 200 tons per year, which has already made a kind of thin typing paper of rather good quality. Once it has fully exploited the sources of raw materials, its need for writing paper could be satisfied.

Right after the round of political activities, the Tan Trung agricultural cooperative has found the right direction for its business by putting the feed-grinding installation of the locality into operation, milling paddy for people in neighboring villages

so as to fully use its machines, buying earth-grinding equipment for its brick- and tile-making installation, stepping up handicraft and small industrial production and achieving the building of the agricultural and industrial structure right at the primary level. To improve somewhat the living conditions of cadres and civil servants in organs and cities and to achieve immediately what could be done right away, the Ha Bac Provincial VCP Committee discussed with the commercial sector the need to find ways to ensure the supply of all goods of the fixed-quantity category and to change the hours of goods selling to suit the work schedules of administrative workers and industrial producers. The Bac Giang produce store, thanks to new sale hours, was able to sell 4 more tons of green vegetables a day as it created favorable conditions for cadres and civil servants to buy foods at their convenience. The food and beverage store was reorganized. The province assigned the grain sector trade union the task of organizing the feed-grinding job and supervising the sale of feed at cost to cadres and workers for expansion of animal raising by individual families, etc.

The round of political activities in Ha Bac encouraged all echelons and sectors to have new thoughts and new effective work so as to fulfill the 5th Party Congress resolutions.

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CSO: 4209/471

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

BRIEFS

STRONG PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATION--The primary party organization of Son La Normal Middle School has been recognized as the strong one of Mai Son District in Son La Province. Through productive labor and learning emulation movements, the primary Youth Union organizations in Ha Son Binh Province provided advanced training to and introduced 5,045 outstanding members to the party, with the most typical ones being those of My Duc District and the Da River Hydroelectric Power General Corporation. In the first 6 months of 1982, the province acquired 346 additional young party members. The district and city Youth Union chapters, in coordination with committees of district VCP committees, opened 25 training courses for 1,200 of their members to improve their knowledge of the party. [Excerpt] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 13 Aug 82 p 3] 5598

CSO: 4209/471

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

BRIEFS

HA NAM NINH RESETTLERS--Ha Nam Ninh Province plans to send 1,000 additional families to various new economic zones in coastal and mountain regions by the end of this year. The province will provide these resettlers with money and construction materials in order to help them quickly resettle in their new places and engage in production. [BK010746 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 31 Aug 82] To date, Yen Hung District, Ha Nam Ninh Province, has sent more than 9,000 people to build new economic areas. Half of this number have participated in building two new economic areas right in the district itself. They are called the (Na An) and (Song Khoai) new economic areas. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 5 Sep 82 BK]

MINH HAI NEW SETTLERS--Directed and assisted by the central committee for the distribution of manpower and population and the ministries of agriculture and labor, over the past 6 months Ha Nam Ninh has sent 1,756 families with 9,446 people to build new economic areas. In particular, the number of people going to Minh Hai Province has increased fourfold over the same period last year and is equal to the total number of people sent during the past 4 years (1978-1981). [BK071129 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Aug 82 p 2]

CSO: 4209/486

AGRICULTURE

AN GIANG MOBILIZES 100,000 TONS OF WINTER-SPRING GRAIN

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by Ngo Minh Duc: "In Only a Month An Giang Mobilizes 100,000 Tons of Winter-Spring Grain"]

[Text] Recently An Giang Province concentrated all efforts on doing a good job of mobilizing grain for the state. In a period of only a month the province mobilized 100,000 tons of paddy, the greatest amount ever. Of that amount, 15,500 tons were collected in taxes and old debts; 15,400 tons were collected to liquidate old two-way contracts; and 8,800 tons were exchanged for materials and merchandise. The average mobilization rate was 3,173 tons per day and the average mobilization level was 1,400 kilograms per hectare. Many villages in the districts of Chau Thanh, Phu Tan, and Cho Moi had mobilization levels of more than two tons per hectare.

With its all-out efforts, An Giang attained 57.32 percent of its annual mobilization plan and 79.05 percent of its tax norm for the season. In the province as a whole, 103 production collectives, 5 agricultural cooperatives, 36 hamlets, and 11 villages collected all of their old debts and taxes for the entire year. Two units -- the city of Long Xuyen and Tri Ton District -- essentially fulfilled their season norms for taxes and old debts, and three other units attained between 70 and 80 percent.

The districts with the greatest quantities and ratios were Phu Tan, with 8,512 tons; Cho Moi, with 7,063 tons; Phu Chau, with 5,161 tons; and Chau Thanh, with 3,491 tons.

In addition to mobilizing grain, An Giang stepped up the plowing and planting the summer-fall and 10th month rice seasons. The province as a whole plowed 49,300 hectares and planted 40,500 hectares of summer-fall rice. During the 10th month season it plowed 80,200 hectares and planted 17,000 hectares, while also planting 6,700 hectares of subsidiary food crops of the various kinds.

Thus An Giang attained a high percentage of two monthly norms of two key missions: mobilizing winter-spring grain and production during the summer-fall and 10th month rice seasons. It attained the highest ratio in mobilizing winter-spring grain. The victories in those two missions in An Giang were due above all to successful

winter-spring production, to the attainment of the highest area, yield, and output levels of any winter-spring season. Those results brought about a new enthusiasm among the party organization and people in the province, and were objective advantages for the attainment of good results in the mobilization of winter-spring grain. The An Giang party organization fully understood the nation's urgent need for grain this year. It is internally unified and has a high degree of determination and a spirit of producing for the entire nation, of keeping just enough grain for its own needs so that the rest of the nation will also have enough. That spirit is manifested by the cadres of the sectors and echelons, down to the basic level, and taught to the masses to raise their consciousness.

During this year's winter-spring season, the cadres and masses were enabled to understand the urgent need for grain is in theory not difficult to fulfill. In mobilizing obligatory grain during the recent period An Giang foresaw the difficulties in advance and was therefore able to attain the highest levels of any winter-spring season. Furthermore, during the 1981 10th month rice season floods wiped out 20,000 hectares and caused some of the peasant masses not to have enough to eat, so during this year's winter-spring season the peasants made arrangements among themselves, which will influence the mobilization results.

Realizing those difficulties, the provincial party committee and provincial people's committee drafted plans to overcome them in order to fulfill the missions. The party organizations and governmental administrations at the various levels in the province carried out continuous education regarding the over-all grain situation, opposed all incorrect manifestations among the cadres and party members, and opposed all partialistic and localistic thinking, lack of determination, subjectivism, and self-satisfaction because of personal interests.

Therefore, before beginning the winter-spring mobilization the leadership echelons, especially the provincial party committee and the provincial people's committee, concentrated on enabling their members to fully understand the Political Bureau's urgent grain requirement and enable the cadres and people to realize the difficulties, while also having strong determination to mobilize grain out of sympathy with, and a sense of responsibility toward, the nation. Within the An Giang party organization the mobilization work is regarded as a yardstick for measuring the capability and quality of party members, and for measuring the patriotism and love of socialism of the people. The province concentrated its guidance on three hard-up districts and a number of districts which produce much rice, and sent 129 key provincial cadres to the base level. It balanced money, goods, transportation and cargo-handling facilities, and temporary granaries. The districts and cities also sent nearly all of their key cadres to the base level, in order to concentrate them both on mobilizing grain and carrying out the key permanent tasks while also, by working through the mass organizations, propagandized and encouraged the masses, and were thus able to create a seething mass movement to mobilize grain.

During the main mobilization phase the leadership echelons, including the secretaries and chairmen, along with the members of the standing committee of the provincial party committee and the leaders of the provincial people's committee, personally inspected, guided, and supplemented the plans of, each district, concentrating on the district which grow much rice, in order to promptly resolve the difficulties and problems at the basic level.

The entire province has promoted the form of continuous grain deliveries in the villages and hamlets, created a movement to deliver grain at the district and city levels, and concentrated on grain delivery at the provincial level. Therefore, it achieved good results during two grain deliveries during the month. The grain mobilization rate was between 4,100 and 6,770 tons a day. Good results were achieved in all categories of grain mobilization, such as tax collections, debt collections, and the liquidation of two-way contracts, which accounted for 80 percent of all grain collected. The peasant masses participated enthusiastically in grain delivery, especially in Phu Tan and Cho Moi.

In such places the grain deliveries were meticulously organized. On the basis of the norms that were assigned the village and hamlet administrations drew up lists, balanced each household, production collective, and agricultural cooperative, recorded the tax debts, and liquidated the two-way contracts. Each production collective and cooperative carried out proselyting and set norms. The peasant masses were unified in struggle to attain the norms, ensure that the rice was dry and clean, and make those qualities official norms in the grain delivery cycles. In the course of the campaign each household, production collective, and cooperative voluntarily accepted their grain delivery norms.

The bases carried out the grain delivery plan in each household, hamlet, and village, and then in each hamlet. The other tasks supporting grain delivery -- such as scales, bags, money, and goods -- were meticulously prepared, and the transportation facilities of the state, the cooperatives, and private individuals were mobilized. Thereby each locality organized grain deliveries as if they were very busy, exuberant festival days.

In order to further the emulation movement in many spheres in the province and the grain mobilization work, the standing committee of the provincial party committee and the provincial people's committee organized a ceremony for the signing of an emulation agreement between the districts and cities, and created an increasingly seething emulation movement.

By means of the grain delivery movement the province has matured with regard to its level of organization and command, there appeared many new factors and the new man, and negative phenomena gradually declined.

An Giang's grain mobilization movement is continuing to develop, and the party organization and people of An Giang are endeavoring to rapidly overcome the remaining problems, especially with regard to stevedoring and transportation, and to step up the collection of taxes and old debts, liquidate two-way contracts, and balance each household, and are determined to fulfill the mobilization norm of 180,000 tons during the winter-spring season and contribute to resolving the nation's grain difficulty.

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CSO: 4209/477

AGRICULTURE

CUU LONG LEADS DELTA PROVINCES IN GRAIN MOBILIZATION

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by Na Xuyen: "Cuu Long Skillfully Mobilizes Grain"]

[Text] In 1980 and 1981 the Cuu Long Grain Service had the honor of being awarded a circulating flag by the Council of Ministers for its outstanding emulation accomplishments, especially in mobilizing grain. As of 20 June 1982, Cuu Long had surpassed by 2 percent the over-all 10th month season mobilization norm and the plan for turning over products during that season to the central echelon. Good results were attained in collecting agricultural taxes in paddy, in collecting debts, and in liquidating two-way contracts, and the province attained a ratio of 95 percent in mobilizing the people's surplus paddy.

Rapid Collection of Obligatory Rice, High Results

Cuu Long led the Mekong Delta provinces in collecting obligatory rice. During the past several years, every year Cuu Long has surpassed its norms regarding the collection of taxes and the collection of rice in accordance with two-way contracts. Cuu Long not only collected the full amounts but completed its collections earlier than the other provinces, and usually completes or nearly completes its collections during the 10th month season. That is a basic advantage which helps the province surpass its mobilization norms for the 10th season and for the entire year. In Cuu Long, taxes account for nearly 50 percent of all mobilized grain and grain collected in accordance with two-way contracts account for 25 to 30 percent. In the early fulfillment of those two basic norms, Cuu Long stood on the "threshold" of fulfilling its mobilization plan. During this year's 10th month season Cuu Long attained 93.5 percent of its annual tax collection norm, and collected 94.3 percent of the grain owned in accordance with two-way contracts. Seven districts and cities surpassed their norms. Vung Liem District surpassed its norm for the entire year.

The collection of agricultural taxes in Cuu Long has become a smooth operation. The cadres of the local grain and financial sectors have much organizational experience. The peasants regard paying taxes as their first obligation when the paddy is dried and winnowed. Those results are due to the fact that Cuu Long has correctly determined the foremost importance of tax collection part of the mobilization norms and that it is a basic condition for fulfilling the plan and a motive force for

furthering the fulfillment of the other norms. Cuu Long has gained experience in tax collection over the course of many seasons. That experience includes the prompt establishment of accurate tax books, the early assignment of norms, the full reporting of collections, exemptions in correct accordance with policies, and the close management of tax books.

The grain cadres of Cuu Long, as well as the agricultural cadres, seek out the peasants before they plant. They sign contracts with the people and supply high-yield rice seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, POL, etc. Because they know the concerns of the peasants, and know which fields produced successful harvests and which ones failed, the grain cadres are able to know how much taxes should be collected. That is also a basis on which to help the mobilization campaign command committee consider requests for tax exemptions and reductions in accordance with the policies, bring an end to widespread exemptions and reductions, and struggle rationally and sympathetically with the peasants against the false declaration of the planted area. In 1981 the province discovered that 1,200 hectares of rice land had not been accurately declared. In 1982, 5,400 hectares were discovered, amounting to 6,700 additional tons of taxable paddy.

A good experience of Cuu Long was the flexible application of the requisition-purchasing formula. It was not necessary to complete the collection of taxes and the repayment of debts before the purchases were made. Cuu Long divided its districts and villages into three categories. With regard to districts and villages with low rice yields and output, and in which taxes were collected slowly, it concentrated on collecting the full amounts of taxes and debts, then promoted purchasing. In districts with successful harvests it concentrated its forces on simultaneously collecting and purchasing (at the beginning of the season, at low prices). In villages with a good tradition of fulfilling their obligations, and which have organized production collectives (Vung Liem, Cau Ngang, and Binh Minh), the requisition-purchasing stations may pay negotiated prices at the beginning of the season so that the peasants can have debt-repayment money when the main planting is being harvested. Coordinating those three methods, every year Cuu Long maintains its mobilization rate, even though paddy prices in the Mekong Delta are continually changing, which causes many neighboring provinces to have to make adjustments.

Cuu Long pays special attention to developing the mass movement to fulfill grain obligations by means of grain-delivery festival days. The "three internal definitive acts" and "five definitive acts" movements among the people had a truly good effect. Thanks to those movements, many localities fulfilled their norms in a short period of time. In 1981 Thanh My Village in Chau Thanh District collected all 772 tons of tax rice and fulfilled its 10th month mobilization norm a month before the deadline. In 1982, Hien Thanh Village in Vung Liem District fulfilled its grain mobilization norm a month and a half early. By the end of April, 7 districts and 70 villages in the province had fulfilled their obligatory annual norms, and 5 other districts had fulfilled their plans.

Since the beginning of 1980 Cuu Long has contributed to the state 135,000 tons of tax rice, and practically all tax debts from last year have been collected. The situation of delaying or evading has essentially ended. When they go to Cuu Long, people see that not only do grain cadres go to mobilize grain but all cadres, from

the secretary of the provincial party committee to the district and village leadership cadres, share responsibility and regard the fulfillment of the grain obligation toward the state as their own obligation and responsibility.

Ensuring Quality, Reducing the Waste of Grain

Cuu Long, which achieves good results in requisition-purchasing grain, is also a province in which grain deposited in granaries is of good quality. The ratio of waste has gradually declined. In 1980 it declined by .7 percent in comparison to 1979, and in 1981 it declined by 1 percent in comparison to 1980. Every year Cuu Long saves thousands of tons of paddy for the state when mobilizing grain. The reason for the decline in grain loss was that Cuu Long closely guided the regulations regarding the quality of grain deposited in granaries, while also taking positive steps to guide deposits in granaries and the transporting and storage of grain. Although the quantity of grain deposited in granaries in 1981 and the 1982 10th month season was greater than during the previous year, in requisition-purchasing the amount of moist paddy and paddy mixed with extraneous matter were held to the lowest level. Many districts, such as Tam Binh, Cau Ke, and Tra On, and the city of Vinh Long, ensured the quality of 100 percent of the rice deposited in granaries. Realizing the importance of ensuring the quality of rice deposited in granaries, the Cuu Long Grain Service issued specific regulations to the requisition-purchasing points and the granary areas regarding grain delivery standards. The province's quality control group strengthened its inspection network in each village and requisition-purchasing point. Those measures were accompanied by propaganda so that everyone could realize their responsibility toward the state.

During 1981 and the 1982 10th month season, all of the requisition-purchasing point in Cuu Long carried out meticulous quality control. The granary technical teams inspected the rice deposited in the granaries. Paddy that was still damp was dried on the spot; if it was mixed with extraneous materials it was sifted before being weighed. In many places the peasants also competed with one another to ensure the quality of grain deposited in the granaries. Some places, such as Tra Cu and Duyen Hai districts, in which previously much dirt and sand were mixed in with the grain, began to make progress. Throughout the 1982 10th month season no weighing and receiving station left paddy out-of-doors.

In the transportation phase some bad people, taking advantage of the shipping of bulk rice, in the past stole rice, which they replaced with water and sand. That both caused a loss of rice and damaged the rice. The transporting of bulk rice also caused difficulties for cargo-handling and caused the loss of much rice. In 1981 and the first half of this year Cuu Long meticulously prepared packaging. The Grain Service purchased 400,000 bags and repaired 97,000 torn bags. During the 1981-1982 10th month season Cuu Long used more than half a million bags and resolutely refused to transport bulk goods.

With regard to goods in the transportation phase, the Grain Service decided that when they are delivered the transportation facility owner and the granary keeper must verify the quantity and quality, then note them on the bill of landing. That procedure was followed rather strictly in 1981 and during the recent 10th month season.

In 1980 and 1981, Cuu Long built 20,000 additional tons of permanent and semi-permanent granaries, 10,000 tons of temporary granaries, and 40,000 square meters of drying patios. During the recent 10th month season it used 10,000 additional tons of granaries and sheds and 6,000 square meters of drying patios. Paddy sent to areas with concentrated granaries is carefully inspected and categorized every day. In 1981, tens of thousands of tons of paddy were redried before being deposited in the granaries. There are ventilation shafts in the granaries. A number of large granaries (the Vinh Thai and Tam Binh general granaries) have ventilation systems which ensure sufficient ventilation. In 1981 the Vinh Thai general granary, which handles more than 80,000 tons of grain a year, had a damage rate of only .3 percent (the allowable rate is .7 percent). The Tam Binh and Tra Vinh general granaries (with a capacity of 12,000 tons) also had a damage rate that was below the allowable rate. A preliminary recapitulation of the first 5 months of this year, Cuu Long reduced the damage rate by 50 percent in the transportation and storage phases in comparison to the previous year. That was a notable accomplishment.

Reducing Circulation Expenses

In preparing each "campaign" to mobilize grain the Cuu Long Grain Service must prepare transportation, cargo-handling, and other facilities months in advance. A seminar on transportation was organized at an early date and achieved good results. At that conference the Grain Service and the Communications-Transportation Service concluded an agreement regarding transportation, the number of railroad cars, the quantity of cargo to be transported, and the transportation time. The problems of the Communications-Transportation Service were also promptly resolved.

In Cuu Long, waterborne transportation (ships and boats) accounts for 60 to 70 percent of all transportation, and such transportation facilities are much less expensive. Therefore, the full utilization of all waterborne transportation facilities is a requirement that was set for the Grain Service. The grain bureaus knew the number of boats of each village, campaigned among the boat owners, and fully utilized the transportation capabilities of the people. When there are only small canals connecting one hamlet with another, and large boats or trucks cannot be used, small boats belonging to the people are used. That prevents the loss of time in waiting and requires less labor.

With regard to cargo handling, Cuu Long's principal method is to use on-the-spot forces. The requisition-purchasing teams, in cooperation with the village financial sectors, used youths in the villages and hamlets as the assault force in that task, thus avoiding waste at a reasonable cost.

In 1981 and the first part of 1982, because it had more than 500,00 bags for use in mobilizing grain Cuu Long saved tens of thousands of dong in wages (labor to fill bags costs 3.5 dong per ton) and both ensured quality and avoided the loss of thousands of tons of paddy.

Due to rational calculations and arrangements in transportation and cargo-handling, Cuu Long was able to save tens of millions of dong. In all, the cost of mobilizing grain in Cuu Long was 109 dong per ton less than the norm.

Cuu Long's working methods clearly have many good features and may be regarded as valuable experiences which, although not yet perfect, bring about real economic results. During the 1981 emulation season, Cuu Long attained many good results and was worthy of being the leading unit of the grain sector in the units in the south.

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CSO: 4209/477

AGRICULTURE

TWO-WAY CONTRACTS IN MEKONG DELTA DISCUSSED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by Hong Hanh: "Some Thoughts on Two-Way Contracts Between the State and the Peasants in the Mekong Delta"]

[Text] In the Mekong Delta grain production is in nature commodity production. The producers are collectivized peasants and individual peasants, who account for most of society's commodity grain. For many years now we have regarded the signing of two-way contracts with peasants as an important economic measure in the state's mobilization of grain. Although that has stimulated the development of production, it has not yet ensured control by the state of a stable and increasingly greater quantity of commodity grain, in order to meet the urgent grain needs.

There may be many reasons, but an important reason, we believe, is that the signing of two-way economic contracts between the state and the peasants has not yet been well implemented in many respects.

Some Lend, While Others Demand Debt Repayment

During the recent period the state has invested fertilizer, POL, and insecticides in agricultural production in the Mekong Delta in two basic forms. In the first form, the bank lends capital to the peasants, who use the borrowed capital to buy materials from the state in order to produce. At harvesttime the people sell rice to the state and repay the bank. That form is, in general, rational and ensures that the state is capable of recovering sufficient grain. But because individual production is still widespread, loans to peasants are not extensive, the people still fear troublesome paperwork, etc., so that form is not widely applied. In the second form, the state sends materials directly to the peasants by distributing them according to plan. The central echelon turns over materials to the provinces, which supply them to the districts. The district materials organ supplies the villages. The village and hamlet administrations distribute them to the peasants. That distribution is carried out very simply: each production collective (or group of peasants) draws up a list that is approved by the hamlet, and on the basis of that list the materials organ delivers fertilizer and POL. Here, the irrationality is that that distribution is not closely monitored and does not compel those receiving materials by means of legal contractual documents (ordinarily, there are contracts but they exist in form only). Meanwhile, the recovery of grain from the

peasants is usually left up to the local grain organs. Those organs must perform the irrational task of demanding debt payments without knowing who the debtors are!

In Hau Giang, according to the Grain Bureau the agricultural materials sector sent to the localities 25,000 tons of fertilizer and 7 million liters of POL. With that quantity of materials the state is capable of collecting 75,000 tons of paddy. But recently it was able to collect about 10,000 tons. No one knows where the rest went. At the same time, the Grain Bureau alone invested 12,000 tons of fertilizer and collected 29,000 tons of paddy.

During the recent 10th month and winter-spring seasons, according to statistics of the agricultural materials organ, in Phu Tan District (An Giang Province) 13,000 tons of paddy should have been collected from peasants to liquidate materials supplying contracts with the state, and Cho Moi District should have collected 10,800 tons. But when each peasant household was resurveyed it was discovered that Phu Tan could only collect 8,000 tons and Cho Moi could only collect 7,279 tons. The local administration and the grain organ could not explain what happened to the rest of the rice (about 5,000 tons in Phu Tan and 3,521 tons in Cho Moi). Ordinarily, those "unexplainable figures" include materials supplied for "ghost" contracts, materials that are supplied but cannot be monitored, and materials that are "leaked" here and there. An example: Binh Long Village in Phu Chau District, An Giang Province, declared an increase of 900 hectares in order to receive 135 additional tons of nitrogenous fertilizer. When they received that extra fertilizer, some key cadres there sold it on the market (they were caught in the act of concealing 84 tons of fertilizer).

We believe that such incidents are not isolated. Some people making loans while other people collect debts is not a rational working method.

Is "Buying Outright" a Good Method?

A number of localities in the Mekong Delta have the tendency of suing only part of the fertilizer and POL supplied in advance for production by the peasants, while the rest is used to exchange for paddy right away or sold at high prices for cash, which is used to buy paddy at negotiated prices. Cho Moi District in An Giang Province invested in advance, in accordance with two-way contracts (for production in the 1982 summer-fall season) only 45,000 liters of gasoline, 62,500 liters of oil, and 151 tons of fertilizer, while it sold for cash 125,000 liters of gasoline, 260,000 liters of oil, and 769 tons of fertilizer. Tho' Not and Phung Hiep districts in Hau Giang Province exchanged or sold for cash practically all of their agricultural materials. A cadre with the An Giang Grain Service said to us, "Two-way contracts which supply peasants with materials in advance are difficult to implement, for there is no way to collect sufficient paddy. An Giang only concludes them to carry out the Ministry's orders. The best method would be to buy products outright."

That "buying products outright" method seems to be fair and easily implemented, but in fact that form of buying and selling is controlled by the market mechanism, which eventually causes it to become deadlocked. And in order to resolve that problem it will be necessary to increase the prices of materials and paddy, which will cause the market to become confused and complicated. We know that a number of localities have automatically increased the prices of materials and used the additional money they earned to "secretly" increase the grain purchase price beyond the guideline set by the state. That is not a good method.

Experiences of Cuu Long Province Must Be Studied

Agricultural materials are valuable goods which the state imports on a priority basis in order to promote production and increase the capability to resolve the country's difficulties regarding grain. Therefore, the localities must promptly take steps to collect a quantity of grain corresponding to the quantity of materials invested by the state.

In addition to investigating in order to recover the grain for the state, we think that the central and local echelons should pay more attention to effectively organizing the signing of two-way contracts, and rapidly bring to an end the situation of "one person lending while another demands the repayment of debts" and of arbitrarily selling agricultural materials so that they do not directly serve agricultural production. Cuu Long Province is accomplishing that by doing the following: the agricultural and grain sectors jointly draft a plan to distribute all central-level agricultural materials sent to the province to the districts and villages, in accordance with the province's policy of selected investment. On the basis of that distribution plan, materials are sent to the districts, where the district grain organs, which sign two-way contracts with the peasants. On the basis of the contracts that are signed (in four copies), the agricultural materials organs issue the goods directly to the peasants so that they can promptly use them in production, and the grain sector borrows capital from the bank in order to pay off the agricultural materials organ.

At harvest time, the grain sector is accepts complete responsibility and contacts the peasants directly in order to collect the grain the peasants are responsible for paying to the state in accordance with the articles agreed to in the contract. Cuu Long Province's method has begun to achieve good results. We should study those experiences.

The above are some modest opinions about a difficulty that has not yet been resolved in the Mekong Delta. We have invited the comrades in the grain sector and in the relevant sectors to study them in order to find the best way to exploit the positive role of two-way contracts between the state and the peasants to requisition-purchase grain.

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AGRICULTURE

FIGHTING DROUGHT GIVEN PRIORITY IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 1 Aug 82 p 1

[Article: "Continue to Give Priority to Fighting Drought During the 10th Month Season"]

[Text] Since mid-June the electricity sector has concentrated the supplying of more than 42,000 Kw/H of electricity a day to electric-powered pumping stations in nine provinces and municipalities in the north which are included in the electricity grid, thus contributing to the irrigation of nearly 500,000 cultivated hectares during the 10th month season.

However, due to prolonged heat and a lack of uniform rain, as of 29 July there were still about 100,000 hectares (including 40,000 hectares of transplanted paddy) affected by drought, which showed down the planting rate and affected the growth of the newly transplanted 10th month rice. In Thanh Hoa Province, 10,000 hectares of 10th month rice were affected by drought. In Hai Hung and Ha Nam Ninh provinces more than 21,000 hectares (principally paddies transplanted in 10th month rice) were seriously affected by drought. Recently the supplying of electricity to the electric-powered pumping stations has not been stable. The amount of electricity actually supplied amounted to only 40 to 50 percent of the total amount requested. The large-capacity electric-powered stations in the provinces of the Bac Bo delta have been lost their electricity many times a day, and some have been without electricity all day long. The fact that practically none of the small pumping stations have been supplied electricity has considerably limited the capability to fight drought during the 10th month season.

In order to rapidly overcome that situation, the electricity, water conservancy, and agriculture sectors have drafted plans to continue to maintain and stabilize the supplying of electricity to the pumping stations in order to promptly provide water to serve the transplanting of rice and save the rice from drought. The provinces and municipalities located within the electricity grid are giving priority to supplying electricity to fight drought and are reducing to a minimum the electricity for civilian consumption and the irrational use of electricity. The Ministry of Water Conservancy reminds the localities to, along with concentrating on rationally exploiting the sources of water by means of the system of electric-powered pumping stations and the irrigation systems and installations, motivate the peasants to use all facilities -- bailing buckets, waterwheels, etc. -- to fight the drought and be on guard against waterlogging caused by unusual changes in the weather.

AGRICULTURE

FISH CATCH GREATLY INCREASED IN MEKONG RIVER DELTA

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Aug 82 p 1

[Article: "Mekong River Delta in 6 Months Gets 95,160 Tons of Sea Products, or 63 Percent of Goal Set for Entire Year, 31 Percent More Than in the Same Period Last Year, With Export Value Reaching 61 Percent of Goal of This Year"]

[Text] As the result of extending the application of piece-work wages and bonuses to the state-operated marine product production installations and end-product contracting to each boat and junk and at the same time properly carrying out export of marine and sea products as a means to maintain balance in connection with materials and fuels, the volume of fish catch was increasing (except in Kien Giang Province). In the first 6 months of this year, the catch was 95,160 tons, or 63 percent of the goal set for the entire year, an increase of 31 percent over the same period last year.

The marine products sector purchased 30,140 tons of shrimps and fish, or 65 percent of the goal set for the entire year and 119 percent of the figure of the same period last year. The export value was nearly 6 million dollars, or 61 percent of the goal set for the entire year. Minh Hai and Hau Giang Provinces reached high figures and achieved fast development. However, the above-mentioned results were still lower than those of the prewar period.

About raising and planting marine products, particularly raising shrimps and fish, for export, many localities did quite a good job; for instance, Minh Hai Province combined growing crops with raising shrimps and Minh Hai and Hau Giang Provinces combined a season of salt making with a season of shrimp catching. However, raising and planting marine and sea products was not yet active and widespread in the delta.

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AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

NGHE TINH DROUGHT--As many as 46,900 hectares of rice in Nghe Tinh Province have been heavily affected by drought. Since early July all districts in the province have mobilized labor forces to carry out irrigation work and spray insecticide to protect rice against drought and insects. [BK310229 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 27 Aug 82]

KIEN GIANG GRAIN OBLIGATION--Since early this year Kien Giang Province has delivered to state granaries more than 71,000 tons of paddy, of which 30,000 tons were paid as agricultural tax. The province is caring for more than 53,200 hectares of the ripening summer-fall rice and accelerating the pace of planting the 10th-month rice crop. The province's financial, banking, transportation, trade and agricultural material supply sectors are coordinating closely with agricultural cooperatives to fulfill the summer-fall rice obligation plan norm. [BK010746 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 31 Aug 82]

VINH PHU WINTER CROPS--Vinh Phu Province plans to plant 16,000 hectares of winter crops of all kinds this year. After completing its 10th-month rice harvest, various agricultural cooperatives have bred seeds for distribution to peasants and cooperative members. The province's seed breeding corporation is striving to supply sufficient seeds to all districts in the province. [BK010746 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 31 Aug 82]

NORTHERN EARLY 10TH-MONTH RICE--Concluding the early 10th-month rice transplanting season, cooperatives in the north have so far transplanted about 170,000 hectares of early 10th-month rice, accounting for 21 percent of the entire 10th-month rice area for 1982 and 60 percent of the 1981 early 10th-month rice area. [Text] [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 5 Sep 82 BK]

AN GIANG COOPERATIVIZATION MOVEMENT--As a result of the application of the system of end-product contracts to groups of laborers and individual laborers during the last crop season, peasants in An Giang Province are enthusiastically participating in collective cultivation activities. In the current summer-fall crop season, the province has set up an additional 242 production collectives, bringing the total number to 626. Cooperativization schools in districts have opened classes to train and improve some 1,081 cadres in management, planning and accounting. [BK071129 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 6 Sep 82]

LAM DONG 10TH-MONTH RICE--Localities in Lam Dong Province, taking advantage of favorable weather, are actively planting their 10th-month rice crop. As of mid-August, they had grown more than 9,000 hectares of wet rice, achieving some 91 percent of planned norms and overfulfilling by 5 percent the norms for the same period last year. [BK071129 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 6 Sep 82]

CSO: 4209/486

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

CORPS BUILDS PORT TO SERVE OIL EXPLORATION

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Jul 82 p 1

[New Products, New Projects column by Nguyen Khac Quynh: "Corps B18 Completes Projects to Serve Exploitation of Oil and Natural Gas"]

[Text] Under the guidance of the Ministry of National Defense, the Oil and Gas General Department and the Viet-Soviet Oil and Gas Combine, with the enthusiastic assistance of the local governmental administration and people, and the state organs, and with the all-out efforts of the cadres and enlisted men, in June 1982 the corps completed a number of projects. The cadres and men had to work day and night in a field with mud 1.5 meters deep and clear 60 hectares of mangrove trees in order to fill in the port area. By concentrating all facilities, they were able to transport 160,000 cubic meters of sand, push back the sea to create a port area of tens of thousands of square meters, and dredged up thousands of tons of scrap metal from bombs and shells and from ships sunk during the past half-century, in order to clear a channel for the passage of ships and boats. They repaired two barges with a capacity of 100 tons, installed electrical winches and manual winches and electrical machinery; installed a 72-ton piledriver in the correct position and with absolute safety; and drove 26 pier piles, each of which was 22 meters long and weighed 2,500 kilograms.

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CSO: 4209/476

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

ELECTRICITY SECTOR GIVES PRIORITY TO KEY PRODUCTION SECTORS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Aug 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Electricity Sector Goes All-Out to Supply Electricity for Agriculture and the Key Installations"]

[Text] Due to the limited supply of electricity, the electricity sector gives priority to supplying electricity for the important production sectors and goes all-out to supply electricity to agriculture and the key state installations. The economizing of fuel and materials is guided in all components and down to the teams, units, and producers. Therefore, during the first 6 months of the year the thermoelectric plants in the north have saved 4,900 tons of fuel oil. The production of electricity attained 50.2 percent of the annual norm, an increase of 5.9 percent over the same period last year.

In the north, there was a serious drought during the second quarter of this year. While the electricity capacity was reduced, the electric power sector has gone all-out to concentrate electricity on meeting the production requirements of the fifth month-spring season and is now supplying electricity for putting out the 10th month crop. However, during the period of fighting the drought and putting out the 10th month crop the situation was not fully understood, so at times the distribution of electricity was not truly appropriate and was not adjusted promptly, according to the continually changing situation. Furthermore, many places have not done a good job of dredging canals and drainage ditches, so they have wasted electricity and have not fully utilized the pumped water.

In the south, in addition to attaining 55 percent of the annual production norm Electric Power Corporation No 2 organized the production of .5 million KW/H of gas turbine electricity outside the plan, thus contributing to increasing the supply of electricity to serve production and life. The distribution of electricity in the south was relatively stable and the number of hours electricity was cut on a rotating basis was reduced. Inspecting the enterprises and avoiding peak hours served to reduce the fixed capacity of the Ho Chi Minh City-Da Nhim electricity system by about 10,000 kilowatts.

In central Vietnam, despite many machinery breakdowns and low electricity output, because it guided and restricted the use of electricity in daily life Electric Power Corporation No 3 ensured the supplying of more electricity to the production sectors than called for by the plan.

However, during the past 6 months there were many weaknesses in the production and use of electricity in our country: load management was not yet truly tight, the distribution of electricity to consumers was still arbitrary, at times the distribution of electricity among the various areas did not suit the requirements, many key installations used excessive amounts of electricity, and many key production installations organized supplementary production and used a large amount of electricity outside the plan, which created difficulties for the electricity grid.

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CSO: 4209/476

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

BRIEFS

LANG SON POSTAL NETWORKS--Since February 1979, the Lang Son provincial post and telegraph sector has repaired and installed 500 km of dual provincial and interprovincial wire network and 400 km of dual district wire network. In addition to the installation of several wire networks in various border districts to support production and the task of maintaining combat readiness, the sector has equipped 10 districts and cities with a radio communication network and some localities along the border with a shortwave radio communication network. [BK310229 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 30 Aug 82]

CSO: 4209/486

POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

MONTAGNARDS PARTICIPATE IN SETTLEMENT PROGRAM

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Aug 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "In Thuan Hai and Gia Lai-Cong Tum Ethnic Minority People adopt Fixed Cultivation and Fixed Habitation, Stabilize Living Conditions, and Develop Production"]

[Text] To date, Thuan Hai has persuaded more than 3,500 families totalling more than 20,000 people of the ethnic minority groups to adopt fixed cultivation and fixed habitation at 22 locations in 6 mountain-region districts. They have cleared and restored more than 1,050 hectares and created 700 hectares of wet-rice paddies, which have water conservancy installations so that they can control irrigation and drainage.

In Ham Thuan District, 100 percent of the ethnic minority people have settled down and are producing well. Three fixed cultivation-fixed habitation villages -- Dong Giang, Ham Can, and My Thach -- have created 134 hectares of wet-rice paddies, cleared nearly 700 hectares of land for growing subsidiary food crops and industrial crops, built four medium and small water conservancy works to irrigate 150 hectares of two-crop paddies and 25 hectares of three-crop paddies, and increased the average annual yield from 1 ton to 1.5 tons per hectare.

Many fixed cultivation, fixed habitation areas in the province began to apply intensive cultivation measures, increase the number of growing seasons, develop animal husbandry in order to obtain manure, and use water buffaloes to work the soil. The villages of Dong Giang and Dong Tien in Ham Thuan District, La Ngan and Da La in Duc Linh District, and Phuc Chien in Ninh Hai District have annual yields of from 3.5 to 4 tons of paddy per hectare. Those villages attained an average per-capita output of 385 kilograms per year and have sell tens of tons of subsidiary food crops (in paddy equivalent) to the state on an obligatory basis.

Responding to the movement for all the people to plant trees to "always remember Uncle Ho," between the end of May and mid-June the people of the Jarai and Bhanar ethnic minority groups, along with the organs in A-Dun Po District, Gia Lai-Cong Tum Province, planted 10,000 coconut trees. Each family of settlers in nine villages in the district planted 20 coconut trees.

Those trees were "lua" coconut trees selected by the district agricultural sector and sent in from the plant nursery in Phu Khanh Province. That variety of coconut is suitable for tropical, hot, and humid climate, grow and develop well, produce fruits early, and produce many tasty fruits.

The district New Economic Zone Section and Agricultural Section sent cadres to help the people to zone the coconut groves and to tend the trees, thus ensuring that the trees developed well and quickly allowed the harvesting of fruit. The sectors and units in the district were also distributed seedlings to plant 200 coconut trees. Before receiving the coconut tree seedlings the organ zoned the coconut grove area and laid out the rows for concentrated planting that were the correct distance apart.

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PUBLICATIONS

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